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Media content distribution is a widely useful tool that has seen increasing
popularity driven by the rise of new technologies. File sharing constitutes one
popular style of content distribution, whereby users are interested in download-
ing all data as fast as possible. File-sharing systems are efficient in distributing
data that is fully available in advance and when there are no strict time or order-
ing constraints on the reception of data by interested nodes. This dissertation
focuses on a second style of content distribution, in which data must be deliv-
ered at a constant rate, with minimal latency from the original time of distribu-
tion by the sender. Live streaming systems have become quite popular in recent
years, and in places like China, are now widely used for broadcasting television
channels to several thousands of users.
The peer-to-peer paradigm (P2P) allows live streaming systems to scale on
the number of users and to be robust in the face of simple failures. By employ-
ing interested nodes’ upload capacities to help upload data to other nodes, the
costs at the sender are minimized and the system is able to scale to very large
numbers of receivers. Unfortunately, the reliance on untrusted nodes’ resources
also leads to security problems and lack of guarantees, leaving such systems
vulnerable to attacks that may impede nodes from receiving data in which they
are interested. In particular, live streaming protocols deserve special attention
since their time sensitive nature makes themmore susceptible to the packet loss
rates induced by attacks.
In this dissertation, I propose and evaluate techniques that enhance the scal-
ability and resilience of live streaming systems. First, I investigate the vulner-
abilities of previously proposed tree-based and mesh-based dissemination sys-
tems and present SecureStream, a P2P live streaming system built to tolerate
malicious behavior at the end level. I present the main components of Secure-
Stream and present results that demonstrate its resilience in the face of a limited
class of attacks. Next, I consider the effect of selfish behavior on the distribu-
tion of data and present a practical auditing approach designed to encourage
fairness in P2P streaming. I demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed ap-
proaches through experiments using a custom built event-driven simulator and
when appropriate, with an implementation of the system evaluated over the
Emulab testbed.
I also address the problem of heterogeneous upload bandwidths amongst
users, and propose and evaluate a hierarchical approach that allows dissemina-
tion of live streaming data in such scenarios. The approach relies on filtering
the contents being disseminated, and on providing higher quality data to nodes
with higher upload rates. One of the components necessary for the proposed
approach is a tool that allows nodes to collect statistics about the overall upload
bandwidth distribution across the system. Motivated by this requirement, I fi-
nally present NightWatch, a tool that allows nodes to estimate distributions of
values held by other nodes (e.g. their upload bandwidth) in a decentralized and
inexpensive manner. Such a tool has broader applicability, being also useful for
monitoring purposes in large-scale distributed systems.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
MayaHaridasanwas born in Brası´lia, Brazil on February 5th, 1981, two years
after her parents migrated from the southern state of Kerala, in India. Dur-
ing her first year in high school, convinced by her brother, she took part in a
computer programming class, which sparkled her interests in Computer Sci-
ence. Motivated by the field, in 1998 she started her undergraduate studies in
Computer Science at the University of Brasilia, Brazil, acquiring the Degree of
Bachelors in Science in 2003. Soon after graduation, she moved to Ithaca, NY
to further pursue her interests in Computer Science at Cornell University, from
where she earned a Masters Degree in 2007, and expects to earn a Doctorate
Degree in 2008.
iii
Dedicated to my parents.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I have thoroughly enjoyed the five years that I have spent at Cornell. I would
not have reached this point without the people that surrounded me.
First, I would like to thank my advisor, Robbert van Renesse, for all the
teachings, encouragement and patience throughout these years. Robbert had
a particular talent for lifting my mood whenever I came into meetings unmoti-
vated about results or anxious about research perspectives. Furthermore, I am
thankful for the trust he placed in me, which helpedme gain confidence in mak-
ing decisions by myself. I have been lucky to have such a brilliant, humble and
kind advisor.
I would like to thank Ken Birman, for always actively taking interest in
my progress. I am grateful for all the compliments and criticisms, which have
helpedme improvemy technical skills, and for the encouragement to keepmov-
ing along. I appreciate that Ken has always tried to understand my difficulties
and, in subtle ways, encouraged me to overcome them.
I am grateful to Geri Gay, Radu Rugina and Dexter Kozen, for participating
in my committee and being supportive of my progress. Thanks as well to all
members of the Distributed Systems research group, who have at one point or
another, contributed tomy experience at Cornell. In particular, toWerner Vogels
and Ingrid Jansch-Porto, with whom I had the pleasure of collaborating.
I also cannot forget Becky Stewart, Stephanie Meik, Bill Hogan and Cindy
Robinson, who alwaysmanaged to put a smile onmy face as I had to go through
the typical paperwork of Graduate School, making everything seem trivial.
Now for some not-entirely-work-related acknowledgements, I would like
to thank some friends who contributed to filling these years with fun. Bistra
Dilkina, Ellan Fei Spero, Paula Petrica, Filipp Akopyan, Anton Morozov, Basit
v
Riaz Sheik and Carlos Tadeo Ortega Otero, for the many fun moments, and for
proving that different cultures can have fun together. Lori Lorigo and Kiran
Gajwani, for showing me that there is actually life during the PhD and that
stress is not a mandatory requirement. Anne Marie O’Donnell and Mila Go¨tz,
for making our house not only a true home, but undeniably the best place in
Ithaca.
Yejin Choi, for treating me with mom-style care when I most needed it. Am-
rita Basu, for sharing with me the dream of the day when all this would be
over and we would take a well-deserved spa trip together. Nosheen Ali and Jui
Bhagwat, for sharing so much with me and having gone beyond housemates
and friends (now my sisters by choice), and specially for bringing me closer to
my roots and feeding my appreciation for desi fashion.
I would like to specially thank my family for their eternal encouragement
and support. Without them, I would never have aimed so high, and I have
no words to thank them for all their dedication. To my brother, who knowing
my interests and abilities, encouraged me to study Computer Science in the
first place, undeniably one of the best decisions I have made in my life (Who
knows what boring job I would now have had I not listened to him?) .To my
mother, whose sweetness and wisdom never fail to surprise me. And to my
father, who, as much as I hate admitting it, was, is, and will always be right
about everything.
And last but not least, I would like to thank Ilya Ganusov, an unexpected and
invaluable treasure that I take from this journey through Cornell. For enduring
all the yelling and the crying that no one else saw, always providing mewith the
best and most sound advice, and for making me a more confident and positive
person.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Malicious Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Freeloading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.3 Heterogeneous Bandwidths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Related Work 15
2.1 Live-Streaming Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.1 IP Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.2 Application-Level Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.3 Improving Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1.4 Popular Commercial Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Computation of Aggregate Information in Large-Scale Systems . 36
2.2.1 Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2.2 Synopsis Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3 SecureStream: Intrusion-Tolerant Live Streaming 41
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.1 Pull-Based Streaming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.2 Intrusion-Tolerant Membership Protocol . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.3 Ensuring Integrity of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.1 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.2 Emulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4 Enforcing Fairness through Auditing 71
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2.1 Expected Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2.2 Effect of Freeloading Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
vii
4.3 System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.1 Auditing components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3.2 Adaptive Threshold Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4.1 Auditing Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5 Carambola: Heterogeneity-Aware Live Streaming 94
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2 System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2.1 System Model and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2.2 Basic protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.1 Inter-layer links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3.2 Packet Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6 NightWatch: Gossip-Based Distribution Estimation 112
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.2 System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.2.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.2.2 Basic Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.3.1 Effect of Duplicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.3.2 Sample Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.3.3 Array Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7 Conclusion 128
7.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.2 Limitations and Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Bibliography 134
viii
LIST OF TABLES
4.1 Strategies for defining the threshold t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.1 Configurations defining streaming rate and upload rates of fast
and slow nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 IP Multicast Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Single-tree application-level multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 BitTorrent Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 PPLive Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1 Effect of omission attacks on single-tree dissemination . . . . . . 42
3.2 Effect of omission attacks on SplitStream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Connectivity between source and nodes in SecureStream . . . . . 46
3.4 Logical rings in Fireflies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5 Linear digests authentication protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.6 Merkle Tree chaining authentication technique . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.7 TESLA authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.8 Effect of packet size on signature and verification overheads . . . 57
3.9 Effect of packet size on network overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.10 Effect of peers that completely fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.11 Effect of peers that do not forward packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.12 Effect of peers that over-request packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.13 Effect of peers that over-request and do not forward packets . . . 62
3.14 Cumulative distribution of number of packets received by nodes 63
3.15 Sensitivity to peers’ maximum upload capacity . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.16 Sensitivity to number of neighbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.17 Sample streaming session on the Emulab testbed . . . . . . . . . 68
3.18 Latency of packets on the Emulab testbed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.19 Cumulative distribution of avg and max packet hop count . . . . 70
4.1 Scalability of BAR Gossip and Chainsaw protocols . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Bandwidth usage when maximum contribution rate is varied . . 75
4.3 Effect of freeloading on peers’ download rates . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4 Effect of freeloading on peers’ upload rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5 Use of auditing on a sample streaming session . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6 Local Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.7 Global Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.8 Fixed-threshold strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.9 Effect of strategies when freeloading rate is varied . . . . . . . . . 89
4.10 Effect of strategies when percentage of freeloaders is varied . . . 91
5.1 Overlay with nodes with heterogeneous bandwidths . . . . . . . 95
5.2 Download rates when using random placement . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Percentage of nodes that receive over 90% of data . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 Multi-layer node configuration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.5 Comparison between random and Carambola topologies . . . . 105
5.6 Effect of number of links between layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.7 Latency in packet distribution without filtering. . . . . . . . . . . 109
x
5.8 Latency in packet distribution with filtering. . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.1 Effect of duplicates in collected samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.2 Comparison of strategies with uniform distribution . . . . . . . . 121
6.3 Comparison of strategies with exponential distribution . . . . . . 121
6.4 Comparison of strategies with Pareto distribution . . . . . . . . . 122
6.5 Comparison of strategies with bimodal distribution . . . . . . . . 123
6.6 Estimation of parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.7 Effect of array size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
xi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Access to multimedia content on the Internet has grown rapidly in recent years
and currently accounts for a large fraction of Internet traffic. This growth has
been driven by different styles of multimedia dissemination, such as file shar-
ing, on-demand streaming and live streaming, each of which requires that dif-
ferent timing and delivery requirements and challenges be addressed.
One driver for this trend involves file sharing, currently one of the most pop-
ular styles of content distribution. In these systems, data is fully available prior
to dissemination. The main goal of file sharing systems is that nodes receive the
entire data within as little time as possible, without constraints on the order in
which blocks arrive. Systems like Napster [42], Gnutella [3], Kazaa [64] and Bit-
Torrent [24] are well known examples of peer-to-peer file sharing solutions; in
these systems, client systems collaborate to speed the delivery of desired data.
On-demand streaming is another popular style of distribution. Again, data
being disseminated is fully available in advance. With streaming, data should
ideally be received at a constant rate. The order in which packets are deliv-
ered is important since data is used as it is received. On-demand distribution
is suitable for media files that can be reproduced at any time, with loose timing
constraints with respect to the delay between user request and start of playback.
YouTube [110] is a typical example of an on-demand streaming service, and sev-
eral media companies such as ABC [1] and NBC [74] are now using on-demand
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streaming to disseminate episodes of popular television programs to interested
users, among other uses.
The focus of this dissertation is on the live streaming style of dissemination,
where data should be received by interested users within a short interval from
the original transmission by the sender. Live streaming presents a different set
of challenges when compared to on-demand streaming, since data is not nec-
essarily available prior to the dissemination and several users are interested in
receiving the data almost simultaneously. This style of distribution is useful to
broadcast live events in close to real time and to broadcast television over the
web. In China, for example, live streaming has become very popular. Appli-
cations like PPLive [84, 48] are used to propagate multiple channels simultane-
ously to hundreds of thousands of users over the web.
The Promise of Internet Television
Live streaming is often associated with IPTV and Internet Television. The term
IPTV typically refers to IP-based services provided by telecommunication com-
panies, which invest heavily on infrastructure to build a proprietary network
that can ensure high quality delivery of television content to subscribers, simi-
lar to cable television. Despite using IP technology for the delivery of contents,
IPTV has little in common with the traditional web philosophy, since it does not
give arbitrary users the power to stream media on a global basis. As such, even
though IPTV has been claimed to satisfy all needs for web-based streaming ser-
vices, in reality it does not meet the need for a service potentially accessible to
any interested publisher.
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While IPTV services provided by telecommunication companies are prob-
ably best suited for broadcasting popular channels with high-quality stream
rates, streaming over the public Internet allows for a wider range of publishers
and contents, favoring diversity and satisfying a wider range of interests. Inter-
net Television refers to this broad concept of sending stream over IP networks,
under which the live streaming model studied in this dissertation fits. Internet
television refers to a more accessible framework, where the provider of a stream
does not control the entire media over which it is disseminated. Streams are dis-
seminated over existing infrastructure, which makes it accessible to any content
provider.
Implementing a live streaming system as envisioned by the promise of In-
ternet Television requires protocols that do not impose excessive costs on the
publisher. Several protocols have been designed and employed to achieve this
goal. Next, a brief description of the current technology behind live streaming
is presented. A more detailed presentation of the most important live streaming
systems to date is postponed until Chapter 2.
Application-Level Multicast
The trivial approach of sending data from the source of a streaming session to
each of the interested clients through unicast connections does not scale to a
large number of clients, since the bandwidth cost at the source becomes pro-
hibitively expensive. Several research efforts have attempted to employ more
scalable alternative solutions.
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Initial approaches attempted to implement multicast distribution at the IP-
layer [28, 29]. IP multicast, if widely deployed, would present an efficient and
simple solution for implementing live streaming dissemination over the web.
Unfortunately, despite earlier promises, IP multicast presents several disadvan-
tages that have prevented it from being widely deployed. It adds complexity at
the IP layer by requiring routers to maintain state, andmakes it hard for systems
to provide higher level features like reliability, congestion control and security.
To overcome this problem, several application level multicast protocols
(ALM) that rely on clients’ upload resources have been designed and widely
studied as an appealing alternative to IP multicast, and previous work has
shown that they can be as efficient without incurring large overheads [23, 53, 17,
62, 111, 76, 100]. In ALM protocols, members are organized into an application-
layer topology (overlay), which is used to define neighbors with which mem-
bers establish point-to-point connections. With this peer-to-peer (P2P) style of
dissemination, where clients contribute with upload resources to the streaming
protocol, the promise is that anyone may start their own live streaming session
to any number of clients.
In ALM protocols, the sender first breaks down the data being disseminated
into packets at the application level. Early ALM systems employed a dissem-
ination tree rooted at the sender, through which all data would flow to all the
nodes [23, 53]. In tree-based streaming systems, the sender forwards packets
as soon as they are ready to its immediate descendents in the tree, and each
node in the tree repeats the process, forwarding the received data to its own
descendents.
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But these tree-based systems turned out to have a few problems. First, in
these approaches, internal nodes in the tree are single points of failure, and if
any of them fails, all of the failed nodes‘ descendents stop receiving data until
the tree is repaired. Another problem is that the load of forwarding packets is
not fairly distributed across all nodes: leaf nodes do not forward any data.
Given the lack of resilience and fairness of single-tree approaches, tree-based
approaches that attempt to equalize the forwarding load across all nodes in
the system [17, 62, 100] were employed. These second generation approaches
work by constructing multiple paths for the flow of data, and then send dif-
ferent packets down different paths. Even though they enhance fairness in the
system, such techniques also require complex protocols for building and main-
taining multiple paths.
Attempting to avoid the costs and complexity incurred by tree-based stream-
ing approaches, several data-driven (also called mesh-based or pull-based) ap-
proaches have been employed [111, 76]. Nodes are organized into a connected
mesh, where each node is assigned a given set of neighbors. In these ap-
proaches, packets are not pushed down to nodes. Nodes only push notifications
about received packets to their neighbors, and use some scheduling protocol to
choose where to request each packet from. The fact that nodes may now fetch
packets from different sources makes data-driven protocols more resilient to
churn and simple failures. Furthermore, they are simpler to implement and de-
ploy since no complex tree maintenance protocol is required. Nodes instead
only need to maintain partial membership knowledge about a few neighbors
with which they exchange packets.
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1.2 Challenges
Despite significant advances in P2P live streaming functionality, previously em-
ployed protocols still present problems that need to be overcome and that hin-
der the adoption of these technologies. This dissertation focuses on three of
these problems and attempts to employ a set of techniques to address them.
First, we consider security vulnerabilities of existing streaming systems and
how these can be exploited by malicious attackers. Next, we explore problems
caused by the presence of non-cooperative (or freeloading) members, which do
not have malicious intents but can nevertheless severely degrade dissemination
quality by reducing the combined upload bandwidth of the system. Finally,
we consider the presence of members with heterogeneous upload bandwidths.
This is a common issue, but is not addressed in most existing protocols.
1.2.1 Malicious Behavior
The reliance on users’ upload resources for propagating data during a streaming
session leaves P2P streaming systems vulnerable to malicious behavior. Users
may opt to deviate from the specified streaming protocol with the goal of dis-
rupting the dissemination of certain types of content. Nodes may achieve this
goal by simply running a modified protocol so that they are capable of partici-
pating in the streaming protocol, perhaps without being detected and ejected.
The degree of disruption that can be caused by individual compromised at-
tackers depends on many factors, such as the protocol being used and the lo-
cation of malicious nodes in the overlay. These effects can be localized and
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minimized if the protocol in use has no single points of failure. On the other
hand, vulnerable systems like those based on a single dissemination tree can be
crippled if a node high in the tree is compromised. Possible attacks on P2P live
streaming systems include:
Membership Attacks: The system may be attacked by compromising the un-
derlying overlay or membership protocol on which it runs. For example,
systems that run on top of ring-based overlays are vulnerable to eclipse at-
tacks [93], in which an attacker gains control over a large fraction of the
neighbors of correct nodes, preventing correct overlay operation. Ma-
licious nodes may also mimic degraded but correct members, or accuse
other correct members of having failed.
Forgery Attacks: Attacks may involve fabrication and tampering of data being
streamed in the system. Given adequate CPU resources, these attacks can
be easily avoided by use of a public key infrastructure. However, at high
data rates the cost of signatures can become prohibitive, at least with the
most popular authentication protocols.
Denial-of-service (DoS) Attacks: Malicious nodes may overload correct peers
with requests for packets or large amounts of duplicate packets, or other-
wise disrupt them in ways that compromise their ability to contribute to
the streaming session.
Omission Attacks: In applications that require low data delivery latencies,
send-omission is an especially serious type of attack. By not forwarding all
or part of the packets, a malicious node may disrupt the overall system’s
timing or availability properties. The main problem with this kind of at-
tack is that a node’s guilt cannot be easily proved: after all, the network
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itself is quite capable of delaying packets, reordering them, or dropping
them.
Collusion Attacks: An attacker may compromise a set of nodes and exploit
them to perform a coordinated attack to the system, and may orchestrate
the attack to confound whatever defensive mechanisms are built into the
dissemination infrastructure.
1.2.2 Freeloading
Users may act selfishly, desiring to save their bandwidth resources for other
applications. Freeloading (or selfish behavior) may be considered a form of ma-
licious behavior, but the number of freeloaders may be much higher than ex-
pected numbers of malicious nodes and therefore the harm inflicted to the sys-
tem can be much worse. Freeloading has received particular interest and been
amply studied in the context of file-sharing systems [3, 56, 33].
In order to avoid freeloading, BitTorrent employs a tit-for-tat approachwhere
nodes, when exchanging packets, favor neighbors that are able to provide them
with data [24]. The tit-for-tat model has also been explored in BARGossip [65] to
avoid freeloading behavior in a live streaming system. However, the approach
requires the source to stream data to a fixed percentage of the interested users
in order for the protocol to work efficiently, which limits the scalability of the
approach.
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1.2.3 Heterogeneous Bandwidths
The third problem we explore in this dissertation is related to users’ available
bandwidth, which is essential for dissemination of data in P2P systems. Most
P2P live streaming protocols assume that all peers have homogeneous upload
bandwidth connections, and that it is enough to upload data at the same rate
as the data being disseminated. This assumption is not always realistic. Asym-
metric Internet connections are very common and can create conditions under
which some nodes have upload rates lower than their download rates. Further-
more, connection bandwidths vary significantly across the Internet. Fairness
argues that nodes with higher upload bandwidths should be able to download
higher quality data.
Addressing the issue of heterogeneity is complicated by our desire to com-
bine heterogeneous behaviors with fairness requirements (in terms of upload
resources spent by nodes). Systems built to overcome freeloading behavior of-
ten rely on equal contribution of resources, leading to protocols that only work
with nodes of homogeneous bandwidths. In this dissertation we explore this
problem and employ an approach which is able to combine heterogeneity and
resilience to freeloading into a live streaming system.
1.3 Contributions
To summarize, this dissertation presents techniques that improve the resilience
of P2P live streaming systems to malicious attacks and that support bandwidth
heterogeneity. First, we present SecureStream, a system composed of techniques
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that improve the resilience of live streaming in the face of a limited ratio of ma-
licious attacks. Next, we study the effect of freeloading nodes on live streaming,
not previously considered, and employ auditing techniques to enforce fairness
in a homogeneous streaming scenario.
We also present an approach that extends pull-based streaming to account
for nodes with heterogeneous bandwidths, while using a meaningful definition
of the fairness value property. Finally, we present an inexpensive gossip-based
approach to estimate distributions in a system, which is a useful tool for nodes
to implement the heterogeneous extension just mentioned. A brief description
of these contributions is presented below.
SecureStream: An Intrusion-Tolerant Live Streaming System
Our first contribution is the design, implementation and evaluation of Secure-
Stream, a P2P live streaming system that limits the opportunity for an attacker
to compromise the quality of a streaming session, without incurring a high com-
putational or network overhead [44, 45]. SecureStream combines a set of sim-
ple techniques to improve resilience of streaming against the set of attacks pre-
sented in Section 1.2, ensuring that malicious attackers cannot gang up against
any particular node.
To repel forgery attacks, the system employs an efficient packet authenti-
cation technique based on computing and distributing verification digests. To
prevent attacks on the overlay structure (the membership protocol on top of
which multicast systems operate), SecureStream is built upon Fireflies, a scalable
one-hop Byzantine membership protocol [55]. Fireflies is a probabilistic proto-
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col, in which members are presented with a reasonably current view of which
members are live or not.
SecureStream uses pull-based packet dissemination. This approach is at-
tractive because it offers participants a choice among multiple candidate packet
sources. Because participants are not dependent on any particular peer and can
immediately react to failures or attacks, attacks are less damaging. We eval-
uate the resilience of SecureStream in the presence of varying percentages of
attackers and present simulation and emulation results that show that, for up
to a limited percentage of attackers, the system is able to sustain satisfactory
streaming quality.
Audit-Based Approach for Improving Fairness
After evaluating the potential harm inflicted by freeloading behavior on
live streaming protocols, we employ auditing techniques to encourage data-
sharing [43]. Our auditing approach establishes a minimum threshold for the
amount of data sent by any node in the system, and removes nodes that upload
less data than the threshold. Instead of relying on a tit-for-tat mechanism, we fo-
cus on encouraging nodes to respect the established protocol. Nodes are forced
to provide accountable information regarding packets sent to and received from
neighbors, and the auditing system is responsible for detecting and removing
misbehaving nodes.
Identifying misbehaving nodes is not a trivial task, since there is no fixed
minimum amount of data that each node must contribute to the system. If we
assume a model where misbehaving nodes simply do not upload any data, de-
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tecting them would be an easier task. However, once we assume that misbe-
having nodes may adjust their contribution level based on the policy used by
an auditing system, amore elaborate approach is required. We present and eval-
uate an auditing model based on sampling the system and using the sampled
information to build a global view of how the system is currently behaving.
Based on it, auditors employ strategies to identify the misbehaving nodes that
should be punished.
Heterogeneity-Aware Live Streaming
We looked into the problem of bandwidth heterogeneity among nodes in a
streaming system and employ an approach that allows taking heterogeneity
into consideration. We argue for fairness in the dissemination process, by which
we imply that nodes that contribute with more data should also receive higher
quality data. Meanwhile, nodes that are incapable of contributing, or unwilling
to contribute enough upload bandwidth, receive data at the best possible rate
allowed by the outstanding upload resources.
In this work we explored node placement as well as multi-layered video
coding techniques to achieve a scalable and adaptive substrate for streaming
to nodes with heterogeneous upload bandwidths. Different node placement
techniques were explored and analyzed based on metrics such as fairness and
quality of data delivery. Our approach organizes nodes into hierarchical layers
according to their upload capacities: higher-level layers receive and propagate
better quality data to other members of its layer and filter data that is propa-
gated to members of lower-level layers.
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NightWatch: Gossip-Based Distribution Estimation
In live streaming systems where nodes have heterogeneous bandwidths, it is
useful to rank nodes based on their upload bandwidths, in order to allow nodes
to implement a decentralized algorithm for organizing themselves into hierar-
chical layers. This dissertation’s final contribution is the description of Night-
Watch, a tool that allows nodes to estimate the distribution of values held by
other nodes for particular properties (for example, upload rates) [46].
Such a tool has broader applicability, as it can help many kinds of systems
achieve enhanced resilience and sophisticated forms of self-adaptation. We
designed an approach where nodes build estimates of the distribution of val-
ues, obtaining results in a timely and scalable manner. Our approach relies on
gossip-based exchange of data, and uses data synopsis techniques for minimiz-
ing the amount of data exchanged between pairs of nodes. Nodes maintain a
fixed-size array of entries and periodically exchange and accumulate informa-
tion obtained from other peers.
We evaluated our gossip-based approach through simulation, employing
four candidate synopsis techniques. We compared these in terms of quality
of the estimation, storage and bandwidth requirements, and convergence time.
All techniques were evaluated with a diverse set of distributions, including uni-
form, normal, heavy-tailed, and bimodal distributions. By experimenting with
up to a hundred thousand nodes, we empirically validated that a limited num-
ber of rounds and a constant message throughput per node in each round is
sufficient to achieve an efficient and lightweight protocol.
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1.4 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents
related work on P2P live streaming and vulnerabilities of P2P dissemination
systems. Chapter 3 studies vulnerabilities of mesh-based live streaming systems
and presents SecureStream, a system that combines techniques that may be used
to build a system resilient to certain classes of malicious attacks. Chapter 4 looks
into the problem of freeloading behavior, and employs a simple audit-based ap-
proach to ensure the quality of the dissemination process. Both chapters 3 and
4 consider systems where all nodes have homogeneous network bandwidths.
Chapter 5 investigates how to build a live streaming system capable of han-
dling nodes with heterogeneous bandwidths. Chapter 6 presents NightWatch,
a gossip-based tool for estimating distributions of values held by nodes in a
distributed system. Chapter 7 considers future work and summarizes the pre-
sented work.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATEDWORK
This chapter provides an overview of the problem domain explored in this
dissertation with a focus on work related to ours. First, we review background
work on live streaming systems. We describe the most important protocols pre-
viously employed and that have led to the current state of art, exposing the evo-
lution of the paradigms underlying these protocols. As part of this overview, we
also describe related work on improving the resilience of live streaming systems
to unexpected behavior of internal peers. In the second section, we shift the fo-
cus from live streaming systems and present work related to our NightWatch
system, providing an overview of previously explored gossip-based techniques
that estimate aggregates of information in distributed systems, for monitoring
or other purposes.
2.1 Live-Streaming Dissemination
We start by describing the most relevant streaming protocols employed to date,
to the best of our knowledge. It should be noted that there are a huge number
of such protocols, and we will not attempt to be exhaustive. We group existing
protocols into two main groups, based on the level at which they are imple-
mented, and into subgroups based on their style of packet dissemination.
The first efforts to implement dissemination systems argued for implemen-
tation at the Internet IP level. Later, tree-based protocols in which routing is
performed at the application layer on end hosts were employed, followed by
data-driven protocols. Finally, more recent protocols have attempted to com-
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bine and further improve previous approaches, and improve the resilience of
the same.
2.1.1 IP Multicast
The standard multicast model for IP networks was first proposed in the late
1980s [28]. According to the original model, IP multicast was designed to use
the UDP protocol to provide unreliable delivery of packets to dynamic groups,
which members can join and leave when desired. Furthermore, the source of
a multicast does not need to have membership information about the multicast
group: it suffices to know the address associated with the group.
IP multicast attempts to deliver streams of information to multiple receivers
without burdening the source or the receivers, while still reducing traffic on
the network. Figure 2.1 illustrates IP multicast routing from a streaming server
to a multicast group containing interested clients. Routing of packets from the
source to members of a group is performed by routers at the IP layer, who store
information regarding group membership. In order to specify how far to for-
ward packets, IP multicast routing protocols use the Time To Live (TTL) field of
IP datagrams. The default TTL value of 1 results in multicast packets going only
to other hosts on the local network. Higher TTL values increase the maximum
number of hops that routers will forward a packet.
A special class of IP addresses (class D) is reserved for IP multicast groups.
Nodes are free to join or leave any group at any time. Nodes express interest
in receiving packets by subscribing to a particular group, which is performed
by sending a message to the nearest router following a Group Management Pro-
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Figure 2.1: IP Multicast Routing
tocol. Such protocols are employed by routers to learn about the presence of
group members on their attached sub-networks. The Internet Group Manage-
ment Protocol (IGMP) [16] and the Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) proto-
col [30] are the definedGroupManagement Protocols for IPv4 and IPv6 systems.
Systems that rely on non-standard group management protocols have also been
employed (e.g. [49, 26]).
IPMulticast requires routers that can support it. Since not all Internet routers
supported IP Multicast [29], initial research relied on a virtual network built
on top of the Internet [32]. The Multicast Backbone (MBone) shares the same
physical media as the Internet while using a parallel system of routers that can
support multicast. MBone is composed of networks that support multicast, each
of which runs a multicast routing demon. These deamons are connected with
one another via unicast tunnels. Later, two Internet2-based backbones, namely
very-high-speedNetwork Backbone Network Service (vBNS) [52] andAbilene, besides
the commodity Internet, have also been used to study and deploy interdomain
IP Multicast protocols.
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Intradomain Protocols
Initial IP multicast efforts were focused on intradomain protocols. In these pro-
tocols, hosts interested in transmitting data to a multicast group send data to
their nearest router, which takes responsibility for forwarding the data to other
routers involved in the multicast for the particular group. Data is thus for-
warded by routers towards interested nodes, following a tree path through
routers. The path followed by packets is defined by the routing protocol.
Some multicast routing protocols build a single tree path for each dissemina-
tion source (source tree approach), while others build a tree which is shared by all
sources (shared tree approach).
Source tree protocols build a single shortest path tree (SPT) for eachmulticast
group, which is rooted at the source of themulticast stream. Building the tree for
a group is usually performed using Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) [27]. Such
protocols have the advantage of providing the most efficient path to receivers
of each group, but require routers to keep a large amount of information, given
that each source requires a specific dissemination tree.
The Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol (DVMRP) was the first
source tree protocol used to make routing decisions on the MBone [104]. It cre-
ates trees using a broadcast-and-prune technique, by which packets sent by the
source are forwarded downwards by routers, until prune messages are received
from routers downstream. Prunemessages are sent back by a router towards the
source to indicate that its downstream interfaces do not lead to any members of
the desired group. Protocols that follow this broadcast-and-prune technique are
also known as dense mode protocols, in reference to their adequacy for densely
populated topologies. Other source tree protocols include the Multicast Exten-
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sions to OSPF protocol (MOSPF) [72] and the Protocol Independent Multicast
(PIM-DM) [2].
Building individual trees for each multicast source incurs significant com-
plexity and space overhead at core and edge routers. In order to avoid these
costs, shared tree protocols have been employed. Shared trees use a single com-
mon root placed at some chosen router in the core of the network, called the
rendezvous point (RP), to bring sources and receivers together. These protocols
require significantly less storage at the routers at the cost of introducing some
latency in packet delivery since paths are no longer optimal. Core Based Tree
(CBT) is an example of a shared tree protocol [11].
Adaptive solutions have also been proposed. The Protocol Independent
Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) approach combines the advantages of both
shared and source-based trees [34]. The protocol switches between a shared tree
and a shortest path tree if performance thresholds are not satisfied, attempting
to find the right tradeoff between complexity at the routers and packet latency
depending on the multicast scenario.
Interdomain Protocols
All these protocols were designed without much consideration to scalability,
and are only applicable in intra-domain settings. Some solutions have been de-
veloped to support inter-domain routing, such as theMulticast Border Gateway
Protocol (MBGP) [97] and the Multicast Source Discovery Protocol (MSDP) [35].
The combination of MBGP, PIM-SM and MSDP aims to make multicast routing
hierarchical, extending previous approaches.
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MBGP is an extension to the BGP protocol [89] used by border routers to
reliably exchange network reachability information. MBGP’s main role is to
provide next-hop information between domains, which routing protocols use
to find the best path towards sources. MSDP further helps achieve interdo-
main multicast by allowing a rendezvous point in one domain to find out about
sources in other domains. The protocol works by having representatives in each
domain announce the existence of sources to representatives in other domains.
The MBGP/PIM-SM/MSDP combination has been considered only a short-
term solution because of scalability concerns [7]. Several other approaches have
been designed aiming to provide more elegant solutions to the problem of intra
and interdomain routing [96, 63, 10, 49, 57, 86].
Problems with IP Multicast
Despite the advances in IP multicast technology and its increase in use within
commercial settings, a few issues have prevented it from being deployed at a
global scale. One of the main problems with IP Multicast is the complexity and
space overhead that it requires at core and edge routers, violating the popular
end-to-end argument [91], which argues that whenever possible, intelligence
should be pushed to the endpoints of the network [108]. IP-multicast routing
protocols require routers to maintain large routing tables, and impose high com-
putational and network overheads.
Router migration is another important consideration, since older hardware
do not support IP Multicast. Furthermore, most solutions lack simple and scal-
able mechanisms for supporting access control, protection against routing at-
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tacks, address allocation and network management [31]. Firewalls and lack of
support for Network Address Translation (NAT) further hinder global adoption
of IP Multicast. These problems have led to a slow adoption of IP Multicast on
large scale settings in the Internet.
2.1.2 Application-Level Multicast
In response to IP multicast’s slow deployment in global settings, research fo-
cus on live streaming moved from the network layer to the application layer,
starting with the End System Multicast (ESM) service [23]. This and other
Application-Level Multicast (ALM) systems implement all multicast-related fea-
tures at the end systems. In ALM systems, nodes are organized into an overlay,
which denotes a logical network running on top of the Internet. Communica-
tion between nodes in the overlay relies on IP unicast and therefore does not
require changes to the underlying infrastructure.
Single Tree
Some of the first ALM protocols relied on the use of dedicated servers for the
dissemination of data (Scattercast [21] and Overcast [53]). Other protocols, like
Yoid [36] and ALMI [78], were the first ALM protocols to argue for an entirely
peer-to-peer architecture. In this later architectural model, nodes participating
in the stream not only receive but may also upload data to other nodes, and
little or no extra dedicated infrastructure is necessary. Independent of the basic
architecture, the first generation of ALM systems relied on approaches based
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Figure 2.2: Single-tree application-level multicast
on pushing data down to interested nodes through a single dissemination tree
rooted at the source of the stream (Figure 2.2).
Narada [23], which is the protocol used for routing packets in ESM, was one
of the first tree-based streaming ALM systems. In Narada, nodes interested in
the stream are organized into a mesh structure using a decentralized protocol.
The mesh is constantly updated by nodes, which periodically search for better
neighbors, adding and removing links based on some utility function. Routing
algorithms are then used to build dissemination trees rooted at the source, using
only connections from the underlying mesh.
Scattercast [20, 21] employs a combination of dedicated proxies, which are
connected to each other via unicast connections, and locally-scoped multicast
groups. Interested nodes either connect to the closest proxy through a local IP
multicast group, or (if this is impossible) create a unicast connection. Similar
to the mesh maintained by end systems in Narada, proxies in Scattercast are
organized into a dynamic mesh and periodically run a local mesh optimization
protocol. Dissemination trees are built for each source and multicast group.
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In Overcast [53], nodes are organized into a dissemination tree that adapts
to the underlying network conditions. The tree is constructed with the goal of
optimizing the download bandwidth of users. Nodes initially join the tree by
contacting the source, and then recursively compare the bandwidth achieved
with its current parent to the bandwidth it would achieve if it connected to
any of the parent’s children. Furthermore, nodes periodically check if they can
improve their bandwidth by testing connections with their siblings, parent and
grandparent.
Rendezvous points (RPs) are used by Your Own Internet Distribution
(Yoid) [36] and by ALMI (Application Level Multicast Infrastructure) [78]. Yoid
is a peer-to-peer protocol which maintains one or more RPs associated to each
multicast group, which are dedicated nodes. These RPs maintain a list of cur-
rent group members, querying them periodically to check for their liveness, and
serve as a bootstrap mechanism. Members contact a group’s RP whenever they
are interested in receiving data from that particular group. Meanwhile, the Yoid
Topology Management Protocol (YTMP) organizes nodes into a tree topology
for dissemination. At first, nodes request from a RP a set of members of a mul-
ticast group, and connect to the first member whose maximum set of children
has not yet been reached. Later, nodes periodically test connections to other
members discovered through the RP in search for lower latencies.
ALMI [78] was designed for large numbers of groups containing a small
number of members. Every multicast group has a session controller, which is
responsible for calculating the minimum spanning tree overlay for the session
members (interested nodes). The controller ensures that the tree is always con-
nected, providing parents for joining nodes and handling node departures. Fur-
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thermore, it instructs each member to monitor and collect measurements from
a few others, which it then uses to periodically recalculate the minimum span-
ning tree. The reliance on a centralized approach improves reliability, but does
not allow ALMI to scale to large numbers of members within a group.
Some tree-based protocols are built on top of Distributed Hash Ta-
bles (DHTs) that provide a routing infrastructure between nodes, such as
Bayeux [113](built on top of Tapestry [112]), Scribe [18] (built on top of Pas-
try [90]), and an ALM protocol [88] built over CAN [87]. DHTs are decentral-
ized distributed systems that provide a lookup service similar to a hash table,
allowing any participating node to efficiently retrieve the value associated with
a given identifier. The best known DHTs use P2P architectures, and achieve log-
arithmic routing time for packets.The use of DHTs provides multicast protocols
with a scalable and often fault-tolerant routing mechanism which can be used
to connect nodes and route messages.
Several other systems based on single-tree dissemination of data have been
designed [12, 92, 98, 15]. One of the main disadvantages of peer-to-peer pro-
tocols based on pushing data through a single tree is that the task of upload-
ing data is not fairly distributed between nodes in the system. In a dissemina-
tion tree, only internal nodes propagate data, while leaf nodes simply receive
data, not contributing to the dissemination process. Furthermore, such proto-
cols present single points of failure, since the crash of one internal node leads to
all its descendants not receiving any data until the tree is repaired.
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Splitting the Flow of Data
Later work on peer-to-peer streaming systems focused on improving fairness
among peers and resilience to churn (nodes joining and leaving the system).
Bullet [62] and SplitStream [17] were two of the first protocols to address the
lack of fairness of previous protocols. Later, ChunkySpread [100] enhanced the
benefits provided by splitting the load more evenly.
Bullet distributes the load among nodes by breaking the data stream into
packets and sending them to peers through disjoint dissemination paths. The
protocol achieves this behavior by combining mechanisms from both tree and
mesh-based overlays. Packets are pushed down through different paths in a
constructed overlay tree and are then exchanged between peers through ran-
dom perpendicular links along the tree. Bullet relies on existing protocols for
building the initial distribution tree. The source of the tree chooses a subset of
its children to send each packet to, which recursively repeat the process and
randomly choose subsets of their children to propagate the data. An impor-
tant component of Bullet is the RanSub protocol, which is used to disseminate
information about which packets each node holds, so that nodes can later use
perpendicular links to obtain missing packets from peers that have received
them.
SplitStream [17] is a multiple-tree dissemination protocol, which splits the
streamed data into stripes and disseminates each stripe through a different dis-
semination tree. The trees used for dissemination consist of disjoint sets of in-
ternal nodes, leading every node in the system to be an internal node in at most
one tree. This property leads to an ideally fair system, where every node up-
loads data at the same rate as the stream being disseminated. SplitStream uses
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the Scribe multicast protocol [18], which in turn uses the Pastry DHT [90] for
building dissemination trees. Scribe first identifies a rendezvous point (RP) by
requesting that a Pastry node route a packet using the group identifier as the
key. The node reached is defined as the RP of the group, and the dissemina-
tion tree is built by combining the routing paths from the RP to each member
of the group. SplitStream uses separate Scribe multicast trees for each of its k
stripes. Despite improving the load distribution across all nodes, SplitStream is
a complex protocol and does not avoid tree-related vulnerabilities to failures.
ChunkySpread [100] uses a protocol reminiscent of SplitStream. It breaks
data into k stripes and uses multiple dissemination trees. Unlike Split-
Stream, ChunkySpread allows nodes to contribute with heterogeneous up-
load bandwidths to the system, based on their capacity and willingness. In
ChunkySpread, nodes are organized into an overlay mesh, where the number
of neighbors a node has is proportional to its available upload capacity. By peri-
odically exchanging local information with neighbors, nodes select parents and
children to maximize the stream quality taking load and latency into account.
One of the main criticisms to most of these protocols is the complexity and
costs involved in building and maintaining the required dissemination trees in
the face of churn. With the exception of Bullet, all presented protocols are purely
push-based protocols, which do not allow for easy recovery from lost data trans-
missions.
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Pull-Based Systems
More recent work on peer-to-peer systems has focused on a different paradigm
for the dissemination of data. Instead of the traditional model of pushing data
towards all nodes, in these new protocols nodes are organized into an overlay
mesh and request data from other peers based on knowledge of what pack-
ets each peer holds. This model is commonly called data-driven, pull-based or
mesh-based streaming, all of which are indicative of properties of these systems.
Mechanisms for exchanging information on what packets each node holds and
for requesting packets are the focus of protocols like CoolStreaming [111] and
Chainsaw [76], which were two of the first pull-based protocols.
Coolstreaming presents a simple data-driven approach [111]. In Coolstream-
ing, nodes periodically exchange information about data they hold with a set of
partners, and request missing data from these nodes based on the collected in-
formation. Nodes join a session by contacting the source node, which provides
it with a deputy node that will then provide it with a list of candidate part-
ners. Nodes dynamically update their set of partners through use of the Scalable
Membership Protocol (SCAMP)[38], which allows distribution of membership
messages among participating nodes.
Each node in CoolStreaming maintains a Buffer Map (BM) indicating the set
of packets it currently holds, and periodically exchanges its BM with its part-
ners. Based on the collected maps, a node uses a scheduling policy to fetch
missing packets from its partners. In their heuristic algorithm for scheduling,
nodes first calculate the set of potential suppliers for each missing packet. Pack-
ets with fewer suppliers are scheduled first, and suppliers with highest available
bandwidth are chosen.
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Chainsaw also relies on a membership protocol for organizing nodes into
a mesh overlay, but is not tied to any particular protocol. In Chainsaw, nodes
use a simple policy for requesting packets from neighbors, randomly fetching
packets from those with available packets, only respecting a limit on the number
of outstanding requests. Nodes use notifications to inform neighbors of the
receipt of new packets, instead of the buffer map used by CoolStreaming. Since
nodes are informed of the receipt of packets immediately after their neighbors
receive packets, Chainsaw presents smaller latencies for the receipt of packets
compared to the Coolstreaming protocol. Our work is heavily influenced by the
Chainsaw protocol, and therefore, a more detailed description of the protocol is
presented in Chapter 3.
A similar pull-based approach is used in PRIME (Peer-to-Peer Receiver-
Driven Mesh-Based Streaming) [68]. The main difference between PRIME and
Coolstreaming or Chainsaw is that nodes are connected through a randomly
connected but directed mesh, providing each node with multiple parents and
multiple children. Much as was the case in Chainsaw, notification of new pack-
ets are pushed from parents to children, so that nodes can request packets from
candidate parents. Comparing PRIME and a SplitStream-like protocol, in [69]
the authors argue that mesh-based approaches present better performance over
tree-based approaches due to their flexibility in the packet distribution process.
Meanwhile, hybrid approaches that combine both push and pull style of
data exchange have also been employed. mTreebone [105] uses a set of stable
nodes to construct a tree-based backbone through which most data would be
pushed, where stability is defined by nodes’ ages in the streaming session. In
parallel and for repair purposes, all nodes are organized into a mesh overlay,
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which complements the backbone and through which data is pulled amongst
nodes only in case of data outages. Even though more resilient to churn, the ap-
proach presents similar problems to single-tree approaches in terms of fairness
among nodes in the uploading process.
2.1.3 Improving Reliability
Peer-to-peer systems are vulnerable to rational and malicious behavior because
nodes providing service are untrusted, andmay deviate from the intended orig-
inal behavior. In this subsection we present work that addresses the vulnerabil-
ities of previous approaches, improving reliability of live streaming systems in
the face of misbehaving peers in the system.
Ngan et al. [75] consider fairness issues in the context of tree-based peer-
to-peer streaming protocols. The authors present mechanisms that rank peers
according to their level of cooperation with the system. One of their techniques
involves the reconstruction of trees as a way of punishing opportunistic nodes.
Most of their mechanisms require peers to keep track of their parents’ and chil-
dren’s behavior.
PULSE [81] is a P2P live streaming system that tries to reward nodes that
contribute resources and discourage peers from contributing an insufficient
amount of resources. The main idea consists of using a pull-based dissemi-
nation protocol and moving nodes that contribute with more upload resources
closer to the source, leading to lower packet latencies. The system was evalu-
ated in heterogeneous settings, showing that nodes with higher upload capacity
have a smaller latency compared to less favored nodes.
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Oversight [25] is a framework that enforces download rate limitations on
P2P media streaming systems. The protocol relies on a set of trusted nodes
that store information on the data downloaded by each node receiving data.
Nodes only send an object after consulting the trusted nodes to verify if the
nodes requesting the stream are not over-requesting data. Oversight is targeted
at systems where nodes upload entire media objects from each other, and not
for live streaming systems where all nodes are interested in receiving the exact
same data in close to real time.
Pai et al. studied the effect of different types of incentives on the Chain-
saw protocol [77]. After exploring tit-for-tat and some variations, the authors
present an algorithm that sets up local markets at every node, where neighbors
compete for the node’s upload capacity. Nodes favor neighbors that contribute
more. Experiments were limited, with nodes classified as fast or slow nodes.
The results indicate that the proposed algorithm improves the performance of
the systemwhen the total upload capacity is not enough to supply all the nodes.
Drum [9] targets DoS attacks on gossip-based multicast protocols, eliminat-
ing vulnerabilities to such attacks. The main idea in Drum is to have half of
the links of each node be picked by the node itself, and half be picked by other
peers. That way, even if only malicious peers contact a node, the peer can still
get correct data from the peers that it picks. The authors showed that the ap-
proach works well for multicast protocols which do not have time delays, but
have not studied its performance for multicast systems where a high through-
put of packets is desired and the upload capacities are limited.
BAR Gossip [65] is a live streaming approach that tolerates the existence of
selfish and malicious nodes. Time is divided into rounds, in which each peer
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communicates with another peer selected using a pseudo-random function. In
each round, peers exchange their current history containing the identifiers of all
the current data, as basis for the next exchanges. Nodes also perform a phase of
optimistic push, forwarding useful updates to another pseudo-randomly picked
peer with no guarantee of useful return. The approach requires that the broad-
casting source have full knowledge of all members in the system and always
unicast each update to 5% of the nodes, a limitation on scalability. Despite its
limitations, BAR Gossip was the first streaming system to successfully employ
bartering to enforce fair contribution of nodes.
A general technique to improve fault-tolerance in P2P systems based on
group-oriented monitoring is proposed in [37], which could be applied to small
scale live streaming. An abstraction called link attestation groups is employed to
allow nodes to monitor one another within a group. As long as correctness
properties are defined by developers, nodes may verify their neighbors’ be-
havior and submit digitally-signed attestations. These attestations are shared
among group members and used by nodes to build link attestation graphs. Our
approach to enforce fairness in live streaming pull-based systems shares some
ideas with this work, namely that nodes monitor one another to identify incor-
rect behavior.
2.1.4 Popular Commercial Systems
Most of the protocols previous described have not been deployed in large scale
settings with real users. Coolstreaming [111] is one of the few exceptions, hav-
ing been employed to propagate data to up to 30000 users with more than 4000
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simultaneously being online. More popular P2P systems have been used both
for file-sharing (e.g. BitTorrent [24]) and for live streaming (e.g. PPLive [84]).
We now briefly review these two systems, given that they have been used in
very large scale settings, having thus influenced the design of many protocols
later employed.
BitTorrent
BitTorrent [24] is a file-sharing P2P protocol designed and deployed in 2001.
Since then BitTorrent has become widely popular, being used by millions of
users to download files of interest. Even though it does not present the same
challenges as live streaming systems, BitTorrent’s role as one of the killer P2P
applications has influenced commercial live-streaming systems to follow sev-
eral of its design ideas.
Each user may share or download files, and to do so, it uses a BitTorrent
client, which will exchange packets on its behalf. To each file that is shared, a
Torrent file is associated, which aggregates metadata about the chunks that com-
pose the file and about the server coordinating the distribution of the particular
file (known as the tracker). The tracker only manages connections, not keeping
any copies of the contents of the files being distributed, and therefore requiring
limited bandwidth.
When a peer is interested in downloading a file, it first obtains a torrent file
for it, and based on it contacts the tracker for the file (Figure 2.3). The tracker
then provides the node with a list of currently active peers who are download-
ing the same packet or who have finished downloading it and are now acting as
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Figure 2.3: BitTorrent Protocol
seeds for that torrent. A set of peers that shares a torrent is called a swarm, and
initially consists of only one seed.
The interested peer then directly contacts the peers in the received list and
starts simultaneously exchanging packets with several of them in arbitrary or-
der (non-contiguous). After an initial bootstrapping phase where nodes only
download chunks, they are also able to upload them to other peers, or even to
later act as seeds. Notice that the more popular the file being downloaded is, the
more peers will be participating in the exchange of packets, therefore leading to
faster and more reliable download rates.
BitTorrent clients may employ any mechanisms to optimize their download
rates. In order to discourage packet freeloading (by nodes that attempt to down-
load files without contributing to the uploading process), most BitTorrent clients
incorporate a bartering approach (also known as tit-for-tat) to the exchange of
packets between peers: when satisfying requests of packets, nodes favor peers
33
who also send them back data. To allow newly joined nodes to bootstrap, and
to initiate exchanges between each pair of nodes, clients employ a mechanism
called optimistic unchoking: a portion of each peer‘s upload bandwidth is re-
served for sending chunks to random peers.
PPLive
PPLive is a proprietary system used for live streaming, which has been used to
propagate over 400 channels to 400000 users per day (on average), according to
its website [84]. Channels’ bit rates vary from 250Kbps to 800 Kbps. Despite the
fact that it is proprietary, some characteristics of PPLive have been identified
and exposed in previous work [103, 48]. Other systems similar to PPLive have
also become popular, such as PPStream [85] and SopCast [95].
Each channel in PPLive streams live contents or previously recorded pro-
grams through its own overlay of cooperative peers. As in previously described
systems, contents are broken into packets and nodes help propagate packets
among each other. When a node is interested in receiving a particular channel,
besides participating in the overlay for the desired channel, it may also help
propagate packets in other channels. Unfortunately, the exact protocol used by
PPLive to assign uploading load to nodes is not yet well known.
When joining a channel, a node first retrieves the list of channels from ded-
icated servers that maintain lists of channels. Later, nodes contact dedicated
membership servers to request a set of peers participating in the overlay related
to the channel they are interested in. Starting from the received list, each node
looks for neighbors, periodically updating its set of neighbors as required (Fig-
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Figure 2.4: PPLive Protocol
ure 2.4). At any given time, nodes always maintain a list of real peers, with
whom they exchange data, and candidate peers, for use in case some of the real
peers become unresponsive. UDP packets are used for control packets related to
discovery of peers, while TCP connections are used among peers who exchange
actual streaming data.
A previous study [103] has shown that the average node degree in PPLive
is independent of the channel size, and that the structure of PPLive overlays is
closer to that of random graphs, unlike in file-sharing systems. Randomness,
however, depends on the channel size, being stronger in smaller overlays. As
overlays increase in size, so does clustering of nodes, even though some ran-
domness can still be observed.
35
2.2 Computation of Aggregate Information in Large-Scale Sys-
tems
Our NightWatch system, presented in Chapter 6, employs a gossip-based ap-
proach for estimating the distribution of values held by nodes in a distributed
system. In this section, we present a brief overview of the work most closely
related to NightWatch. First, we present similar work proposing techniques
to compute individual aggregate functions of distributed values. Unlike these
systems, NightWatch attempts to estimate the distribution of values, rather than
individual aggregate functions over the same. Second and last, we present pre-
vious work on synopsis construction techniques. A synopsis is a concise rep-
resentation of a data set, and as such, can provide useful information about
general properties of the data. NightWatch relies on the construction of such
synopses to concisely represent a large number of distributed values.
2.2.1 Aggregation
The idea of computing aggregate functions in large-scale distributed systems
has been extensively studied [13, 99, 109, 54, 5, 73, 67]. The main goal of these
approaches is to minimize the amount of data exchanged and the convergence
times for computing aggregate values, while providing either perfect or satis-
factory accuracy.
In Astrolabe [99], aggregation is employed as a summarization mechanism.
Nodes are divided into non-overlapping zones, which are arranged hierarchi-
cally. Each node runs an Astrolabe agent, which periodically gossips state infor-
36
mation with other agents, both within its zone and from other zones. Depend-
ing on the zone of the agent with which they exchange information (same zone
or not), they exchange information about their own zone or about other zones
that they know of. Leaders in each zone collect information about nodes in its
zone and compute aggregate values. Since all nodes are involved in each query
that an application might be interested in, Astrolabe does not scale well if the
number of queries increases significantly.
SDIMS [109] is a management system similar to Astrolabe. SDIMS hierarchi-
cally aggregates information about large-scale networked systems and provides
a database abstraction for querying the state of the system. The system lever-
ages DHTs to implement a scalable management system. Instead of using a
single tree, multiple trees are used to aggregate different attributes, distributing
the load among all nodes. The routing infrastructure provided by DHTs is used
to determine the nodes that participate in the aggregation tree for any given
attribute.
In [13], Bawa et al. introduce an approach that allows any node to issue a
query for computing an aggregate function (minimum, maximum, count, sum,
average, etc) over distributed data. The paper employs a tree-based solution,
with focus on queries issued by a single peer. In its basic scheme, the querying
peer broadcasts the query to the network, and a spanning tree is constructed
during the dissemination of the message. In the second phase of the protocol,
the answer to the query is computed in a bottom-up fashion, with nodes send-
ing the combined results of their children up towards the querying node. Unlike
NightWatch, in the proposed model the peer issuing the query is the only one
that obtains the information at the end of the aggregation process.
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In the Newscast protocol [54], nodes exchange vectors (cache entries) con-
taining several values for computing aggregate values, an idea similar to the
one employed in the NightWatch protocol. In each round, peers randomly se-
lect another peer to exchange all cache entries they currently hold. The choice
of which cache entries are kept after the new entries are received is based on
the age of the entries. Only the youngest entries are maintained, and the set of
peers associated with each entry constitute the set of neighbors known by the
owner of the cache at a given time. The approach was explored for computing
extreme (minimum and maximum) mean values.
Work on gossip-based aggregation has also been done in the context of sen-
sor networks, where energy and constant loss of communication are important
factors to be considered. TAG (a Tiny Aggregation Service for Ad Hoc Sensor
Networks) [67] builds a tree topology to compute aggregates without spending
much energy, and avoiding duplicate information. Sensors route data towards
the interested querying user through a dissemination tree, aggregating the data
on the way to the root. [73] employs the diffusion of synopses, but focuses on
finding solutions that avoid double-counting values. By employing techniques
that are duplicate-insensitive, different topologies can be used for collecting in-
formation, and redundant paths can be explored to avoid loss of data when
nodes fail.
The main difference between NightWatch and previous approaches, is that
NightWatch aims at estimating the distribution of values spread over a dis-
tributed system, rather than specific aggregate functions. Furthermore, unlike
most systems NightWatch aims to provide every node with satisfactory esti-
mates, rather than one querying node.
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2.2.2 Synopsis Construction
NightWatch relies on the construction of concise synopses of data to minimize
peers’ storage and bandwidth requirements. The need for efficient synopsis-
construction techniques in the context of database systems has led to the pro-
posal of a variety of techniques. Even though the general problem specification
is different, previous techniques, if modified, can be employed in the context of
estimating distributions of values in P2P systems.
Sampling constitutes one form of maintaining a concise representation of a
large set of data. Dynamic approaches based on sampling and storing a fixed
number of values aiming to obtain an unbiased sample, are known as reservoir
based methods [101, 8, 4]. Values are entered and removed from the sampled
set dynamically, as data is processed. To avoid storing duplicate values in the
sample, in concise sampling values in the sample have an associated counter [40].
Advantages of sampling include simplicity, efficiency, and ease of use, being the
only appropriate approach for high dimensional applications.
Several approaches based on the construction of histograms have also been
explored [61, 82, 51, 83, 41]. Histograms group values into bins (buckets), which
makes them good candidates for approximating the frequency distribution of
a large set of values. The use of histograms is straightforward when consider-
ing a static set of values, since they can be pre-computed taking all values into
account. Histogram-based techniques present two main problems, namely the
choice of bucket sizes, and handling dynamic sets of values.
Other more elaborate types of synopsis-based techniques have also been
employed, including wavelets [58, 19, 102] and sketches [50], among others.
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Wavelets and sketches are well studied techniques for decomposing and sum-
marizing data hierarchically. In the wavelet technique, data is decomposed into
a set of wavelet functions and base functions, where the higher coefficients of
the decomposition capture the broader trends in the data and the lower coeffi-
cients capture the more specialized trends. Sketches can be considered random-
ized versions of wavelet-based approaches. A thorough survey of synopsis-
construction techniques for data streams is presented in [5].
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CHAPTER 3
SECURESTREAM: INTRUSION-TOLERANT LIVE STREAMING
3.1 Introduction
Malicious behavior has long been a serious cause of concern in systems de-
ployed over the Internet. Centralized systems are extremely vulnerable due to
the presence of unique points of failure. In contrast, peer-to-peer (P2P) systems
present better tolerance to attacks due to their redundant nature, with multiple
peers collaborating to the execution of tasks. However, many P2P systems are
not entirely decentralized and present unique points of failure, and are therefore
still vulnerable to attacks. Moreover, attackers may have control over internal
nodes in the system and may explore omission attacks in which compromised
peers do not perform their duties, such as forwarding packets to other peers.
This type of attack is not trivial to handle since attackers cannot easily be iden-
tified and proven guilty, and damage to individual nodes or to the overall per-
formance of the system can be severe.
To illustrate the extent of the problem caused by nodes that do not forward
data, we looked into its effects when using a single dissemination tree with
varying branching factors (number of children per internal node) and when us-
ing the multiple-tree SplitStream approach [17]. SplitStream is a robust and fair
P2P system in which data is split into several slices and each slice is propagated
through a different dissemination tree.
In the simulated experiments, a fixed percentage of the nodes do not upload
any data to the system, while the rest of the nodes behave correctly, uploading
41
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
0.250.200.150.100.050.0
D
ow
nl
oa
d 
Fa
ct
or
Ratio of freeloaders to peers
BF = 2
BF = 4
BF = 8
BF = 16
(a) Single Tree - Average Download Factor
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
0.250.200.150.100.050.0
D
ow
nl
oa
d 
Fa
ct
or
Ratio of freeloaders to peers
BF = 2
BF = 4
BF = 8
BF = 16
(b) Single Tree - Minimum Download Factor
Figure 3.1: Effect of omission attacks on single-tree dissemination
as much as required by the protocol in use. As a measure of resilience, we
compute the download factor of a streaming session, which is the ratio of packets
received by a peer within the desired time to ensure proper playback. Using
a round-based simulator, we computed the download factor of all nodes for
sessions with a thousand homogeneous nodes and varying ratios of freeloading
peers.
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we present the average and minimum download fac-
tors across correct nodes. We evaluated singles trees with varying branching
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Figure 3.2: Effect of omission attacks on SplitStream
factors (BF), and SplitStream with varying number of slices. In the case of single
trees, as observed in Figure 3.1(b), individual nodes are prevented from receiv-
ing any packet even with as little as 5% malicious members.
By splitting the dissemination of data into multiple trees, the SplitStream
protocol presents better resilience to freeloading, since every node receives sub-
streams of packets from a diverse set of peers. We varied the number of slices
from 2 to 16. As expected, the larger the number of distinct dissemination trees
used to propagate data, the less disruption observed by users. However, the
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degradation observed by individual nodes is significant evenwith 16 slices (Fig-
ure 3.2(b)), when some nodes receive less than 80% of the data if 10 or more
percent of nodes do not forward data.
In this chapter we present the design and evaluation of SecureStream, a sys-
tem that combines techniques for improving the resilience of streaming against
malicious behavior [44]. Our model of the system assumes the existence of one
source, assumed non-compromised, disseminating data at a fixed rate to a set
of receivers with limited buffering capacity. All nodes have similar download
and upload capacities, slightly larger than the download rate. The desired be-
havior is that the streamed data be received within a fixed latency relative to the
source’s original transmission.
SecureStream combines a set of techniques to improve the resilience of
streaming, which are described in detail in the next Section. SecureStream em-
ploys a pull-based streaming protocol, given its superior resilience to churn and
simple failures when compared to tree-based streaming protocols (as described
in Chapter 2). Furthermore, SecureStream employs an intrusion-tolerant mem-
bership protocol (Fireflies) to tolerate attacks to the membership layer. This pro-
tocol organizes nodes into a connected graph structure that defines each node’s
set of neighbors with which it may exchange packets. Such an imposed struc-
ture limits the extent of damage inflicted by high-level denial of service attacks
and omission attacks, since attackers may not arbitrarily interact with any ran-
dom node. Finally, SecureStream employs a simple yet efficient technique to
avoid forgery of packets. We next describe these approaches in more detail and
evaluate SecureStream both through simulation and execution of our Secure-
Stream implementation on an emulation environment.
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3.2 System Design
3.2.1 Pull-Based Streaming
SecureStream employs a pull-based approach to disseminate packets, following
ideas used in the Chainsaw protocol [76], which is described in this Section.
Nodes are organized into a graph structure, which is used to define which
nodes are allowed to exchange packets with one another. In the graph, each
node has an approximately equal number of neighbors. We will describe how
the graph is constructed in Subsection 3.2.2. The source of the stream is also
assigned a random set of neighbors in the graph. Figure 3.3 shows an example
of the connections between nodes in a small streaming system.
Initially, the source sends notifications to its neighbors as soon as it has
available packets to disseminate. These notifications are small messages used
to inform neighbors of availability of packets. Each neighbor requests packets
from the source in a random fashion (based on the received notifications), to
avoid overloading the source. As nodes receive packets, they propagate noti-
fications to their neighbors, and so packets get disseminated along the system.
This pull-based approach to acquisition of packets leads to increased resilience,
since failure or misbehavior of one neighbor does not impede a peer from fetch-
ing packets from other neighbors. The predetermined set of neighbors for each
node makes it hard for attackers to target individual nodes, since attackers lack
deterministic means of acquiring control of all of a node’s neighbors.
Pull-based streaming is simple and yet highly resilient to failures and at-
tacks. The overhead incurred by notifications is not significant if large packets
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Figure 3.3: Connectivity between source and nodes in SecureStream
are used, and the protocol avoids receipt of duplicate packets. Since it is com-
pletely decentralized, the protocol does not present any single points of failure,
another important consideration when building an intrusion-tolerant streaming
protocol.
Timing Aspects
Packets are ordered by the source and each packet is assigned a sequence num-
ber. Each member stores packets and forwards them to other peers while the
packet sequence number is within its availability window, which is a sliding win-
dow of sequence numbers that is updated as time changes. It also maintains an
interest window, smaller than the availability window, which represents the set
of packets in which the peer is currently interested. A node only requests pack-
ets which are within its interest window. Different policies can be employed by
peers about what packets to pick from each of its neighbors, and the choice of
the appropriate policy is crucial to achieving best overall performance. Random
selection of neighbors is usually a good candidate, leading to fair load balanc-
ing, and is the one we use in our approach.
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There is a predefined limit l on the number of outstanding requests to any
neighbor. This policy is essential to maintain a good flow of packets in the sys-
tem, avoiding nodes from overloading particular neighbors with requests, and
ensuring that data doesn’t follow a trivial tree-like path through all nodes. Fur-
thermore, it also makes it harder for malicious peers to over-request packets
from their neighbors. Peers maintain a queue of non-satisfied requests for pack-
ets, and if more than l requests by the same neighbor are present in the queue
at any time, only the l most recent ones are maintained and potentially satis-
fied. This also reduces opportunities for malicious nodes to flood neighbors
with packets: a node will never have over l requests for packets with any given
neighbor, and therefore any burst of packets will be an indication of malicious
behavior. The use of the limit l on the number of outstanding requests also pro-
vides a solution to network congestion, since nodes will only request further
packets from neighbors whose connections can satisfy their requests in a timely
manner.
3.2.2 Intrusion-Tolerant Membership Protocol
SecureStream relies on the Fireflies protocol [55] to define the communication
graph while avoid membership attacks, through which attackers may attempt
to control the set of neighbors with which peers interact. Fireflies is a scalable
protocol for supporting intrusion-tolerant P2P systems, which provides correct
nodes with a reasonably current view of all nodes which are live.
Fireflies is a one-hop membership protocol (every node knows about every
other node) and is composed of three sub-protocols: a pinging protocol is used
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to detect failures of nodes with an accuracy independent of message loss; an
intrusion-tolerant gossip protocol is used for dissemination of information be-
tween correct members with probabilistic time bound ∆; and nodes use accu-
sations and rebuttals to implement the membership information that Fireflies
provides. These components are briefly described below. For a more compre-
hensive description, please refer to [55].
Each member monitors a specific set of peers for failures using an adaptive
pinging protocol (we later describe the protocol used to define the set of mon-
itored nodes). Members do not use a static global timeout when waiting for
the replies of ping messages, but rather estimate the probability of message loss
and try to adapt to the message loss characteristics between the monitor and
monitored node.
Members are organized into multiple rings, and their position on each ring
depends on their identifier. A hash function is associated with each ring, and
this hash function is applied to each node’s identifier to define the node’s posi-
tion on the ring. These rings determine which nodes monitor, and are allowed
to accuse, which other nodes. On each ring, each member mi monitors the low-
est ranked successor m j that it believes to be live, and if it detects a failed node,
it issues an accusation for that node. In Figure 3.4, for example, node Amonitors
nodes B, D and F, while it is monitored by nodes E, F and G. The same idea is
used to define neighborhood for the purposes of the pull-based streaming pro-
tocol described in the previous Subsection: each node exchanges packets with
its immediate neighbors in each of these rings; nodes are therefore organized
into a connected graph.
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Figure 3.4: Logical rings in Fireflies
Members exchange two types of data structures in the Fireflies protocol:
notes and accusations. All notes and accusations are signed, and a certifica-
tion authority is responsible for issuing private/public key pairs and public key
certificates. Notes are issued by a member to inform and convince other mem-
bers that it is live. Accusations, as previously noted, are used by members to
accuse other nodes of having failed. Notice that accusations are used only for
indicating that a node has failed. Since each node has a determined set of neigh-
bors, other problems such as flooding attacks and other similar nuisance attacks
are avoided by nodes by ignoring the peers inflicting such attacks.
When an accusation for a member mi is received by a member m j, m j waits
a time period of length 2∆, and then removes mi from its view if the accusation
is valid. This time period is established so that an accused member may issue a
new note (a rebuttal) to an accusation against itself. In order to avoid malicious
nodes from abusively accusing its correct neighbors in the rings, nodes may
invalidate up to t rings, implying that accusations issued by its neighbors on
those rings will not be accepted as valid by any correct member.
The dissemination of information such as accusations and rebuttals is per-
formed using a robust gossip protocol. Each member periodically picks a ran-
dom member from its view to exchange state information. The multiple ring
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structure induces a gossip mesh resilient to malicious attacks. Gossip is highly
robust and efficient, with probabilistic bounds on the latency of delivery to all
members [60].
3.2.3 Ensuring Integrity of Data
One second important aspect which needs to be satisfied in a streaming session
is that the data being distributed should not be tampered. Several authentica-
tion protocols have been employed for the general multicast paradigm, origi-
nally intended for IP Multicast [107, 39, 70, 94, 79]. The standard point-to-point
mechanism of appending a message authentication code (MAC) computed us-
ing a shared key does not meet the security requirements of a multicast ses-
sion. If receivers and sender share the same key, any receiver would be able
to forge messages. On the other hand, signing every packet using a traditional
asymmetric cryptographic protocol induces high overhead, and is therefore not
desirable.
Live streaming systems present the following characteristics: packets are not
all available to the sender prior to the transmission; receivers may use the data
as soon as it is received, and receivers might not receive all packets. In this
section, an overview of protocols that can potentially be usedwith these systems
is presented. The first trivial approach, consisting of signing and verifying every
packet does not require further description.
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Figure 3.5: Linear digests authentication protocol
Linear Digests
To avoid the costs of signing and verifying every packet, it is possible to group
the hashes of n packets into a special message, and have it signed by the sender
(Figure 3.5). This signed message would need to be sent to the receivers prior
to the dissemination of data that it corresponds to. This implies a buffering of
content at the sender prior to the dissemination of data. The advantage of this
approach is that it incurs a minimum network overhead of one hash per packet,
while it amortizes the cost of a single signature/verification operation over n
packets.
A special mechanism should be employed to guarantee that the signed mes-
sage is received by all receivers. In order to minimize the buffering delay at
the sender, small groups should be favored. Grouping packets every second or
every few seconds should be satisfactory, since it is affordable to perform one
signature/verification operation per second. This approach may lead to buffer-
ing at the receivers, if they do not receive the signature packet prior to the other
packets in the group.
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Merkle Tree Approach
Wong and Lam [107] amortize the cost of signature/verification operations over
many packets in a stream. The sender computes the hashes of a limited number
n of consecutive packets in the stream, and uses them as leaves in aMerkle Tree,
which is a tree where each internal node consists of the hash of its children. Each
leaf node contains the hash of a packet.
Each packet is appended with the root of the tree signed by the sender,
the position of the packet’s node in the tree, and all the siblings of the nodes
on the path from the root to the node that represents the packet. This allows
each packet to be verified without further delay. In Figure 3.6, for example,
the shaded nodes indicate digests that should be appended to packet 5 for its
transmission.
When a receiver first receives a packet from the group it uses the hashes of
the nodes contained in the packet to compute the root of the Merkle Tree. The
receiver can then verify the authenticity of the packet by using the signed hash
of the root sent with the packet. Once the packet has been verified, the root does
not need to be further verified for any other packets in the group. Therefore, for
each group of packets, the computational cost consists of only one signature for
the sender and one verification for each of the receivers.
The bandwidth overhead of this approach is 1 signature + O(log n) hashes
per packet, since hashes of the node’s siblings on the path up until the root need
to be includedwith each packet. Finding the best tradeoff between computation
cost and network overhead is important when deciding the number of packets
to group in a Merkle Tree.
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Figure 3.6: Merkle Tree chaining authentication technique
TESLA
In [79] Perrig et al. employ a delayed disclosure of keys approach, in which the
sender attaches to each packet a MAC computed with a key originally known
only to itself. Receivers cannot immediately authenticate packets upon receipt,
and may accept or not packets based on the time of receipt. Some limited time
d later, the sender attaches the key to a posterior packet, allowing the receiver
to authenticate the buffered packet. The protocol assumes that all nodes are
loosely synchronized with respect to the sender.
One important step of the approach is that receivers, upon receipt of a
packet, should check that the key used to compute the MAC is still secret by
determining that the sender could not yet have reached the time interval for
disclosing it. Only if the MAC key is still secret should the receivers accept and
buffer the packet. The key for a packet Pi is sent in a later packet Pi+d.
To avoid unverifiability of packets due to packet loss, a one-way chain is
used in the reverse order of generation. One-way chains have the nice property
that if packets are lost, they can be recomputed using later values in the chain.
Given an initial key K0, the sender uses a one-way pseudo random function
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Figure 3.7: TESLA authentication
F to compute the next key in the chain. To avoid using the same key both as
a generator to the next key in the chain and as a key for computing MACs, a
second function F′ is used. Given any key Ki, F
′ is used to derive the key to
compute the MAC of packet Pi (Figure 3.7). Sender uses one-way function F to
compute the set of keys K, and one-way function F′ to compute the set of keys
K′. A key K′i is used to compute the MAC of packet i. Packet Pi+d contains key
K′i which allows authentication of packet Pi.
Prior to the transmission of a group of packets, the sender should transmit
the time interval schedule, the key disclosure delay d and a key commitment to
the key chain Ki over an authenticated channel (for example, using a digitally
signed message).
The network overhead of this approach is one MAC per packet and there
is no expensive signature/verification mechanisms involved, except in the be-
ginning of the transmission. It is important to notice also that TESLA does not
provide non-repudiation. Any node can forge authentic packets after the key is
disclosed by the original sender.
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Graph-based Authentication
Graph-based authentication was first employed in [70]. The idea consists of
requiring that the sender sign only one packet. Subsequent packets in the stream
are linked to that packet in a way that allows them to be verifiable. In order
to tolerate packet loss, a graph is used instead of a single chain. Packets are
represented by vertices in the graph, and a directed edge between nodes that
represent packets Pi and Pj indicates that packet Pj contains the hash of packet
Pi. A packet corresponding to a node can be authenticated if there is a path of
already verified packets between the node and the signature node.
The main challenge in this approach is to build a graph that maximizes the
probability that given the receipt of any packet, there will be a path from the
node that represents it and the signature node so that the packet is verifiable.
In [70], the authors employ a p-random graph, inwhich a directed edge between
a node Pi and a node Pj is added with probability p.
In [94], Expander Graphs are used for the construction of graphs with a low
constant degree independent of graph size. Their main goal is to minimize
the bandwidth overhead and provide a lower bound on the probability that
a packet can be authenticated upon arrival. Many random graphs are expander
graphs and therefore present the properties described in the paper. In [80] Perrig
et al. explore the use of random graphs and present simulation results indicat-
ing they are in general good candidates for use. However, they also show that
not all random graphs yield good properties and some care needs to be taken to
ensure proper graph construction.
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In a streaming protocol where packets are received out of order, graph-based
authentication might require buffering of packets at the receiver.
Comparison of Protocols
We aim to compare all the presented protocols in the context of peer to peer
streaming, and use the Chainsaw style of dissemination as a case study for our
comparison. We will consider the tradeoff between computational cost at the
sender and receivers, network overhead, latency incurred in the system and
guarantee of verifiability of packets. A fixed transmission rate of 300 KB/s is
used and we consider the use of varying packet sizes, as well as different sizes
of windows (buffering at the sender) for computing digests. The size of packets
cannot be increased without limits since it influences the throughput of packets
in a system like Chainsaw, where nodes fetch packets from multiple neighbors.
The computational costs per second at the sender and at the receiver for dif-
ferent authentication approaches are presented in Figure 3.8. Costs when using
different packet sizes are presented, with larger packets presenting lower over-
heads, since fewer packets (and consequently fewer signatures) are required.
The computational cost at the sender can be decomposed into a few compo-
nents depending on the approach, including time to compute hashes, time to
sign data and time to create digests in a format that can be transmitted. The cost
at the receiver can be decomposed into time to compute hashes, time to verify
signed data and time to parse the digests.
Figure 3.9 presents the network overhead incurred by the different ap-
proaches. As expected, the network overhead of the Merkle Tree approach is
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Figure 3.8: Effect of packet size on signature and verification overheads
the highest, since one signature and a few hashes need to be appended to each
packet in the flow (the size of one signature corresponds to approximately 6
hashes when SHA is used for hashing and RSA with 1024 bit key is used for
authentication).
In a live streaming scenario, not all approaches yield full verifiability of re-
ceived packets since not all packets are guaranteed to be received by every peer.
Signing and verifying every packet has the advantage of guaranteeing full ver-
ifiability of received packets. Despite its higher costs, the Merkle Tree digest
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Figure 3.9: Effect of packet size on network overhead
approach is the only other approach that allows packets to be immediately ver-
ified upon receipt, even in the presence of packet loss. With the linear digest
approach and the graph based authentication approaches it is possible that the
necessary information is not available to the peers at the time of receipt of a
packet.
The pull style of dissemination brings out certain problems in some of the
presented techniques. Approaches which require buffering at the receiver, for
example, are subject to denial of service attacks, since the receiver cannot filter
the received packets before receiving authentication information. Another prob-
lem is that techniques which do not allow for immediate verification of packets
at the receiver compromise the quality of the transmission, both in latency and
in throughput.
Given its low costs, SecureStream employs the linear digests approach and
ensures that verification is possible at the time of receipt of packets. We em-
ployed the following adaptation to the pull-based streaming protocol described
in Subsection 3.2.1 to ensure immediate verifiability: each peer, when request-
58
ing a packet from a neighbor, uses a special bit in the request message that indi-
cates whether the digest packet containing the hash for that packet has already
been received or not. Since digest packets are small, they can be appended to
the packet sent in reply to the request, ensuring that packets are immediately
verifiable, only incurring a small overhead due to duplicate digests.
3.3 Evaluation
We originally evaluated the resilience of pull-based streaming in the presence of
attacks through simulation. We also implemented SecureStream using Python,
andwe validated the simulation results by running experiments with our imple-
mentation on the Emulab testbed [106]. Emulab is a network testbed containing
hundreds of nodes, in which real applications may be executed and evaluated.
It allows arbitrary network topologies to be specified, leading to a controllable
and repeatable environment.
3.3.1 Simulation
Webuilt an event-driven simulator and simulated 200 node networks with 50ms
inter-node latency. It would be possible to simulate and present results for net-
works with larger numbers of nodes, but a set of experiments on increasing
numbers of nodes revealed that the behavior remains the same for networks as
large as 5000 nodes. We opted for a smaller size but repeated each experiment
100 times to obtain better confidence in our results.
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The target streaming rate in the experiments was fixed to 300 Kb/s, and
packets of 10 Kb were used. Higher streaming rates yielded similar results as
long as the packet size is accordingly increased to maintain a rate of 30 pack-
ets/s. Each streaming session lasted for 200 seconds. In the basic setting, the
source’s upload capacity was fixed to twice the streaming rate while other peers
had a fixed maximum upload capacity of 1.2 times the streaming rate. These
values are used as our baseline since they are the lowest upload rates at the
source and non-source nodes respectively that lead to good throughput when
the system is not under attack.
For each streaming session we computed the average and minimum down-
load and upload rates across all correct members. We repeated each experiment
100 times, and we present the median and 95 percentile intervals across these
repetitions.
We considered four types of malicious behavior. In the first type of attack
malicious peers act faulty, neither requesting nor satisfying requests. In attack
2 they request packets but do not forward any packets. In attack 3 they over-
request packets from their neighbors, requesting as many distinct packets as
possible from every neighbor. Finally, in attack 4 they over-request packets and
do not forward packets. The fourth type of attack is the most disruptive type
and therefore the most likely, while the other three are considered mainly for
comparison purposes.
Figures 3.10, 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 present results for the basic setting under
each of the attack types. We are interested in minimizing the overall damage to
the streaming session. Damage is quantified by the impact on average down-
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Figure 3.11: Effect of peers that do not forward packets
load rates to healthy nodes, and the minimum download rate for any single
healthy node.
As would be expected, the results show that peer failure does not signifi-
cantly affect the download rates since peers can still request packets from other
correct neighbors (Figure 3.10). Since malicious peers do not request packets in
this mode, they do not disrupt the total overall upload capacity. Even though
upload rates are limited, over-requesting attacks are also not significantly dis-
ruptive, due to the random policy used by peers when satisfying neighbors’
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Figure 3.12: Effect of peers that over-request packets
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
0.250.200.150.100.050.0
D
ow
nl
oa
d 
Fa
ct
or
Ratio of attackers to nodes
Average
Minimum
Figure 3.13: Effect of peers that over-request and do not forward packets
requests for packets and the upper limit on the number of outstanding requests
by any neighbor (Figure 3.12).
Figures 3.11 and 3.13 show that attacks in which peers consume packets from
their neighbors, but do not forward packets, inflict the most harm. There are
two main reasons for this vulnerability. First, since peers upload at a maximum
rate of 1.2 times the streaming rate, the overall upload capacity of the system
gets compromised from peers consuming and not contributing to the system.
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Figure 3.14: Cumulative distribution of number of packets received by
nodes
Second, malicious nodes neighboring the source might impede some packets
from ever being received by any other peer other than it.
The latter effect causes the 95 percentile interval bars to be wide: there is a lot
of variation depending on the number of compromised peers near the source.
To make this point clear, in Figure 3.14 we show the percentage of packets re-
ceived by increasing numbers of peers during sample streaming sessions with
varying percentages of Byzantine peers. The metric to focus on here is the frac-
tion of packets only received by one peer, which is an indicator of malicious
nodes neighboring the source. Packets received only by malicious peers at the
first hop will never be disseminated in the system. To confirm this hypothesis,
we executed the same set of experiments and restricted the malicious attackers
to being located at least 2 hops away from the source. The obtained medians
were very close to the medians obtained in the previous experiments. The main
difference was that the percentile intervals were significantly reduced when the
source had no immediate malicious neighbor, which is an important result since
the intervals are significant in the original experiments with attacks 3 and 4.
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To improve the resilience, we can vary parameters to improve the overall
upload capacity of the system, or to avoid situations in which malicious peers
can isolate certain packets. First, we considered the upload capacity of themem-
bers. In Figure 3.15(a) we varied the value from 1.0 to 2.0 times the streaming
rate and verified the improvements to resilience under attack 4. This graph
presents the average and minimum download rates when the system has 25%
of Byzantine members. The results show that the higher the upload capacity at
non-source peers the more resilient the system becomes. From Figure 3.15(b),
which presents the minimum, average and maximum upload rates of members,
we can see that as a consequence of increasing the upload capacity of peers the
system becomes more unfair, with an increased difference between the max-
imum upload rate and minimum upload rate across peers. For the next few
experiments we fixed the upload capacity of non-source members to 1.4 times
the streaming rate.
To improve the packet loss rate at the first hop from the source, we varied
the upload capacity of the source from 1.0 all the way to 6.0 times the streaming
rate. Our results indicated that this naı¨ve approach to increasing the upload
rate at the source does not significantly affect the resilience of the system. We
also observed that the number of neighbors of the source is a more significant
parameter than the upload capacity of the source. We fixed the percentage of
malicious nodes at 25%, the upload rate at non-source nodes to 1.4 times the
streaming rate and at the source to 4.0 times the streaming rate, and varied the
source’s number of neighbors from 4 to 20. The median slightly improves as the
number of neighbors is increased, but more importantly, the percentile intervals
are significantly reduced. In Figure 3.16(a) we present the absolute sizes of the
95 percentile intervals varying with the number of neighbors of the source. The
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Figure 3.15: Sensitivity to peers’ maximum upload capacity
results show that a larger number of neighbors at the source is desirable. This
happens becausewith a higher number of neighbors the percentage ofmalicious
neighbors of the source tends to be closer to 25% across runs, and therefore there
is less variation in the percentage of packets that are contained at the first hop
from the source.
Finally, to study the influence of the number of neighbors for each non-
source peer in the system, we evaluated the resilience with a varying number
of rings used to define neighbors. The upload capacities at the source and non-
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Figure 3.16: Sensitivity to number of neighbors
source members were fixed to 4.0 and 1.4 times the streaming rate, respectively,
and the source had 16 neighbors. In Figure 3.16(b) we present the performance
of the system using between 4 and 12 neighbors per node, both under no at-
tacks and under attacks of type 4. The results surprisingly show that the use
of larger numbers of neighbors does not improve resilience of the system, and
even reduces when the system is under attack. Even though larger numbers of
neighbors would lead to better connectivity between correct members, it also
presents malicious members with more potential to over-request packets and
unbalance the system.
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3.3.2 Emulation
In order to validate our simulation results, we ran experiments on a 200 node
network on the Emulab testbed using our Python implementation of the Secure-
Stream system. We performed extensive experiments under various parameter
configurations, observing that the tendencies observed were similar to those
verified through simulation.
To illustrate the behavior of the real system in execution, we present re-
sults of a sample streaming session in which 25% of the nodes are malicious,
over-requesting packets and not forwarding them to neighbors. During the first
100 seconds all nodes act correctly, after which the malicious nodes start over-
requesting and not forwarding packets. We fixed the upload capacity of the
source and non-source members to 4.0 and 1.4 times the streaming rate respec-
tively, and the number of neighbors of the source and non-source members to
12 and 8 respectively.
Figure 3.17(a) presents the minimum and average continuity indices of cor-
rect peers throughout the sample session. Around the hundredth second, the
average and minimum continuity indices decrease with the insertion of mali-
cious peers. The minimum, average and maximum upload factors across all
correct peers is presented in Figure 3.17(b). At the point when malicious nodes
are inserted, the upload factors across correct peers increases to compensate for
the malicious peers consuming the scarce resources from the system.
We also observed the effect of the system in the latency of packets. In Fig-
ure 3.18(a), a slight increase in the overall average and maximum delays per
packet in the presence of attackers may be observed. Furthermore, an interest-
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Figure 3.17: Sample streaming session on the Emulab testbed
ing behavior can be observed in Figure 3.18(b), which presents the minimum,
average andmaximum packet delays for each node in the system, relative to the
time of origin of the packet at the source.
Unlike our initial suspicion, all nodes presented similar packet delays over
the streaming session. This indicates that being close to the source does not
imply in receiving packets faster than other nodes, since not all packets will be
requested from the source, because of the limit in number of outstanding re-
quests. To verify if this behavior might vary when the system scales to larger
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Figure 3.18: Latency of packets on the Emulab testbed
numbers of nodes, we simulated networks with up to five thousand nodes. The
maximum latency used for bigger networks needs to be increased, but the aver-
age latency per node is still similar.
We also looked into the number of hops taken by packets before reaching all
nodes. For the same streaming session, we registered the number of hops taken
by each packet before reaching each node. In Figure 3.19 we present the CDF of
the average and maximum number of hops taken by packets. This graph shows
that for our sample session with 200 nodes, the average number of hops mostly
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varies between 3 and 5, while the maximum number of hops taken by each
packet varies between 8 and 22. This large variation in the maximum number
of hops is also verified by the large variation in maximum latency observed in
Figure 3.18(a).
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we presented the design and evaluation of SecureStream, an
intrusion-tolerant peer-to-peer live streaming system. We described and evalu-
ated a set of techniques that allows SecureStream to resist against forgery, DoS,
membership and omission attacks. We showed through simulation and emu-
lation the effect of pull-based streaming on resilience to the class of attacks we
investigated, and we explored how the variation of specific parameters affect
the resilience of the system. Our results indicate that SecureStream tolerates a
limited percentage of malicious nodes, gracefully degrading in the presence of
increasing ratios of attackers to the total number of nodes.
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CHAPTER 4
ENFORCING FAIRNESS THROUGH AUDITING
4.1 Introduction
The peer-to-per (P2P) paradigm allows systems to scale with the number of
users, but also leaves them vulnerable to freeloading behavior. Freeloading
nodes attempt to receive a stream without uploading their fair share of data, re-
ducing the overall upload capacity of the system. Despite the damage they may
cause, not much work has been done in studying mechanisms to avoid their
presence in live streaming systems. In this chapter, a technique for defending
against freeloading users without incurring high overheads is described.
The live streaming approach that most closely relates to our work and at-
tempts to discourage freeloading is the BAR Gossip protocol [65], which em-
ploys a tit-for-tat approach for encouraging nodes to contribute: a node only
sends as much data to another node as it receives back. BAR Gossip provides
an elegant solution shown to tolerate both freeloading behavior and other ma-
licious attacks. However, reliance on tit-for-tat does present a few undesirable
requirements. To be efficient, the data source should ensure that packets are
evenly spread across the system by sending data to a fixed proportion of nodes,
and by sending different packets to different nodes. Furthermore, it requires
the source and all nodes to have full membership knowledge. These restrictions
affect scalability when the data source has bounded upload bandwidth.
To illustrate this problem, we fixed the upload capacity of a data source at
5 Mbps and simulated BAR Gossip when streaming 500 Kbps with increasing
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Figure 4.1: Scalability of BAR Gossip and Chainsaw protocols
numbers of receivers, varied between one and thirty thousand nodes. We com-
pare its scalability against the Chainsaw protocol [76], for which we fixed the
source’s upload bandwidth to a lower value of 2Mbps. In Figure 4.1, we present
the average and minimum download factor (ratio of the download rate over the
stream rate) of both protocols when the number of nodes is increased. As ob-
served, BAR Gossip is not able to sustain its performance without scaling the
upload capacity of the source proportionally with the size of the system. Mean-
while, Chainsaw is able to scale well even with a fixed lower upload bandwidth
at the source, but cannot handle the presence of freeloading nodes.
We use auditing to encourage data-sharing in live streaming systems like
Chainsaw. Our auditing approach establishes a minimum threshold for the
amount of data sent by any node in the system, and removes nodes that upload
less data than the threshold. Instead of relying on a tit-for-tat mechanism, we fo-
cus on encouraging nodes to respect the established protocol. Nodes are forced
to provide verifyiable information regarding packets sent to and received from
neighbors, and the auditing system is responsible for detecting and removing
misbehaving nodes.
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Notice that identifying themisbehaving nodes is not a trivial task, since there
is no fixed minimum amount of data that nodes should contribute to the sys-
tem. If we assume a model where misbehaving nodes simply did not upload
any data, detecting them would be an easier task. However, once we assume
that misbehaving nodes may adjust their contribution level based on the policy
used by an auditing system, a more elaborate approach is required. This chap-
ter presents and evaluates an auditing model based on sampling the system
and using the sampled information to build a global view of how the system
is currently behaving. Based on it, auditors employ strategies to identify the
misbehaving nodes that should be punished.
4.2 SystemModel
Our approach focuses on a target streaming system consisting of one data source
(assumed non-compromised), which disseminates data at a fixed rate to a dy-
namic set of receivers. The source has limited upload bandwidth, and hence
can only send data directly to a small subset of interested receivers. Partici-
pating nodes are consequently required to forward packets to their neighbors,
helping disseminate all packets across the system. The streamed data should be
received by all nodes within a fixed latency from the source’s original transmis-
sion, even in the presence of freeloading nodes.
Our auditing approach is used over the Chainsaw protocol [76], previously
described in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2). The streaming process starts at the source,
which breaks the data stream into packets and sends notifications to its neigh-
bors as soon as it has packets to disseminate. These notifications are small mes-
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sages used only to inform neighbors of the availability of new packets. Based on
the received notifications, each node requests missing packets, and the source
satisfies as many requests as allowed by its upload capacity. Unlike BAR Gos-
sip, with Chainsaw the upload capacity of the source does not need to increase
with the size of the system; even an upload capacity of twice the stream rate is
sufficient to ensure that the system performs and scales well. As nodes receive
packets, they mimic the role of the source, sending notifications to their own
neighbors in the mesh, allowing packets to be propagated through the system.
4.2.1 Expected Behavior
Our first goal is to explore the typical signature of the system, since an under-
standing of the behavior of pull-based dissemination in the absence of freeload-
ing nodes will be important when we set out to introduce auditing. We con-
ducted experiments using an event-based simulator, which is described in more
detail in Section 4.4.
In Figure 4.2, we evaluate the performance of 1000 nodes during an ideal
execution of Chainsaw, where all nodes behave correctly. We fixed the upload
factor of the source at 4.0 (2 Mbps), and the stream rate to 500 Kbps. We varied
the maximum upload factor of nodes to see how it affected both the download
and upload factors of nodes across the system. The maximum upload factor is
a fixed parameter which defines the maximum rate at which a node will upload
data to all its neighbors. For fairness in nodes’ bandwidth consumption, we
would like all nodes to upload data at a factor as close as possible to 1.0. We
varied the maximum upload factor of nodes from 0.9 to 1.2.
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Figure 4.2: Bandwidth usage when maximum contribution rate is varied
Figure 4.2(a) shows the minimum, average and maximum download factors
across the nodes when themaximum upload factor of nodes is increased. As ob-
served, by increasing the maximum upload contribution, we increase the global
upload capacity of the system, leading to a better flow of packets. However,
the discrepancy among the upload factors of individual nodes also increases,
as seen in Figure 4.2(b). Some nodes participate more actively in dissemination
while others end up contributing less, even though all of them behave correctly.
This is an important consideration: when we introduce auditing, we hope not to
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punish nodes that are willing to contribute but cannot do so because of factors
such as their physical positioning in the system. In all our future experiments
we set the maximum upload factor to 1.1.
4.2.2 Effect of Freeloading Behavior
Our next goal was to understand the expected behavior of correct nodes un-
der different scenarios where freeloading nodes compromise the system. We
therefore studied how the download and contribution rates of correct nodes are
affected under these conditions. Freeloading nodes may contribute with some
data in an attempt to disguise their opportunistic behavior. Therefore, we con-
sidered different rates of contribution for freeloading nodes: 0 (pure freeload-
ers), 100, 200, 300 and 400 Kbps.
Figure 4.3 presents the average and minimum download factors among all
correct nodes under different configurations. The stream rate was fixed at 500
Kbps, and all correct nodes had a maximum upload factor of 1.1 (550 Kbps).
We ran experiments with 1000 nodes and increasing percentages of freeloading
nodes in the system (from 0 to 90%). On the x-axis, we vary the percentage
of freeloading nodes. As expected, we can observe that the download factors
of correct nodes decrease since the aggregated upload capacity in the system
becomes insufficient to provide all nodes with all data. Nonetheless, the extent
of the impact may be surprising: with just 10% freeloading nodes, performance
drops by as much as 40%.
Figure 4.4 presents the average and minimum upload factors among all cor-
rect nodes. Once again, on the x-axis we vary the percentage of freeloading
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Figure 4.3: Effect of freeloading on peers’ download rates
nodes, and on the y-axis we present the upload factors of nodes, which can
vary up to 1.1. It is interesting to note that the average upload factor among
correct nodes initially increases, and then starts falling when the percentage of
freeloading nodes increases significantly. This behavior can be explained by
the fact that, initially, correct nodes start contributing more to compensate for
the lack of data provided by a small percentage of freeloading nodes; however,
once the effect of freeloading nodes becomes significant, the system collapses
and correct nodes are not able to keep contributing.
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Figure 4.4: Effect of freeloading on peers’ upload rates
Another important point to note is that the minimum upload factor does not
follow a clearly defined pattern, making it hard to estimate theminimum contri-
bution of correct nodes under compromised scenarios. Therefore, by applying
thresholds to punish freeloading nodes, correct nodes may also be unfairly pe-
nalized.
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Figure 4.5: Use of auditing on a sample streaming session
4.3 System Design
Our idea for auditing the described live streaming system against freeloading
behavior is motivated by the graphs presented in the previous section: we em-
ploy auditing to ensure that all nodes in the system contribute more than a par-
ticular specified threshold. In Figure 4.5, we illustrate the potential benefit from
using auditing in a system where 70% of the nodes are correct and 30% are
freeloaders. The latter do not upload any data. During the first 100 seconds, no
punishment was applied in an attempt to simulate a system with no auditing.
At time t = 100s, auditing is enabled and freeloading nodes start to be expelled
from the system for low contribution. For this experiment, theminimumupload
factor for nodes to stay in the system was set to 0.5.
We present the minimum, average and maximum download factors across
correct nodes varying along 200 seconds. As observed in this particular ex-
ample, auditing has the potential to improve the quality of streamed sessions
significantly, and at low cost. One important concern is that if the specified
threshold is too high, more freeloading nodes may be caught, but correct nodes
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may also be unfairly punished. In this experiment, no correct nodes were mis-
takenly expelled from the system.
4.3.1 Auditing components
We now give some additional details of the auditing architecture, focusing upon
two aspects: (1) collecting auditable information about the download and up-
load factors of individual nodes in the system; and (2) establishing the best
threshold at any given time during execution and removing nodes that do not
contribute at least as much data as specified by the threshold. We employ two
types of components to perform these two roles: local and global auditors. Lo-
cal auditors are executed on the nodes participating in the system, and therefore
cannot be trusted; if a node is malicious, it might report false data. Global au-
ditors are trusted components that run on dedicated external nodes. There can
be just one or a few global auditors. We describe their roles and interactions in
detail below.
Local Auditors
Each node n runs a local auditor, which interacts with other local auditors and
has two main roles:
Publish n’s data exchange history: n’s local auditor periodically compiles and
distributes the history of packets exchanged by n. To accomplish this, ev-
ery δ seconds, it queries the local streaming application running on n for
the set of packets it sent and received using the streaming protocol in the
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Figure 4.6: Local Auditing
most recent time interval (Figure 4.6). The local auditor signs and pub-
lishes the collected history to an assigned subset of its neighboring nodes,
from which other auditors may obtain it. This level of indirection is used
to prevent nodes frommasking their real upload and download factors by
presenting different information to different auditors.
Audit n’s neighbors’ histories: n’s local auditor periodically audits the pub-
lished histories of the nodes with which n exchanges packets. For instance,
if node n exchanges packets with nodes p, q and r in the live streaming pro-
tocol, n’s local auditor compares these three nodes’ histories with n’s own
history. This involves ensuring that: (1) the amount of data sent by these
nodes satisfies the defined minimum threshold for the system; and (2) the
set of packets they claim to have sent to and received from node n corre-
sponds to the set of packets n claims to have respectively received from
and sent to them. If the first check comparison fails, the local auditor is-
sues an accusation against the node to a global auditor. In the second case,
the local auditor is not able to prove the neighbor’s misbehavior; instead,
it instructs its local streaming application to not further exchange packets
with the misbehaving neighbor. More complex types of checks may also
be performed to address other types of Byzantine behavior.
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There are two ways in which a node could pretend to be sending more or
receiving less data than it actually does. It could send different histories to each
neighbor, always lying about its interactions with other neighbors. For example,
n could send a history to p pretending to send more data to q than it actually
did, while it sends a different history to qwhere it pretends to sendmore data to
p than it actually did. n’s goal would be to send less data while not being caught
by any of its neighbors. The process of publishing a node’s history to a prede-
fined set of neighbors ensures that the node cannot send conflicting histories to
different neighbors undetected, therefore avoiding this problem.
A node could also lie about the set of packets sent to or received from a
particular neighbor p. In this case, p will be able to identify that the node has
lied and will therefore stop exchanging packets with n. Given that a freeloading
node’s goal is to maximize its utility, it should have no interest in losing data
exchange partners. Therefore, freeloaders have no incentive to publish incorrect
histories.
Summary: Local auditing ensures that correct information is available re-
garding the set of data sent and received by any node, and allows nodes to
monitor each other’s contribution rates.
Global Auditors
Global auditors are trusted components with global membership knowledge,
which interact with one another and with the local auditors. As shown in Fig-
ure 4.7, global auditors execute on nodes external to the system. Their main
roles are:
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Figure 4.7: Global Auditing
Define the minimum upload threshold: Global auditors periodically sample
the state of the system by querying local auditors. They then cooperate
to analyze the collected samples, and on this basis compute the minimum
upload contribution threshold. Different strategies may be employed for
choosing the best possible threshold, given different scenarios. Global au-
ditors may change the threshold based on the current conditions of the
streaming session. If the threshold is modified, it is gossiped to all local
auditors, which apply it when auditing their neighbors.
Remove nodes from the system: Global auditors are also responsible for ver-
ifying accusations issued by local auditors against particular nodes, and
after validating the accusation, removingmisbehaving nodes from the sys-
tem. Validation involves verifying that the accused node’s history indeed
indicates that the node is sending less data than the current threshold. Re-
moving a node involves informing the nodes’ immediate neighbors of its
status and forcing the removal of the node from the overlay mesh.
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The number of global auditors may vary according to different parameters,
such as the size of the system. The use of more global auditors distributes
the load of sampling and improves efficiency in reacting to accusations against
nodes. Global auditors are also perfect candidates to performmembership tasks
such as acting as rendezvous points, since they are required to have full mem-
bership knowledge of the system for performing their auditing roles.
Summary: Global auditing monitors the global health of the system to iden-
tify the best value for the minimum upload threshold at any time during a
streaming session, and makes final decisions regarding punishment of nodes.
4.3.2 Adaptive Threshold Strategies
Choosing an upload threshold requires care: a low threshold may not be suffi-
cient to identify freeloading nodes, while high thresholds may incorrectly pun-
ish correct nodes. We considered three strategies for the choice of the minimum
contribution threshold used for identifying misbehaving nodes.
The simplest strategy sets a fixed threshold (e.g., t = 0.5), independent of
the current state of the system. In this case, any node contributing at a rate of
less than 50% of the stream rate would be removed. One downside of using
a fixed threshold is that freeloading nodes that learn the threshold can simply
contribute at the lowest possible upload factor, thus avoiding detection. From
the graphs in section 4.2, it is clear that such a strategy may disrupt the stream-
ing session. Meanwhile, choosing a high threshold is not a practical option,
since correct nodes would get unfairly punished.
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To avoid this problem, we have explored adaptive strategies. One simple
strategy starts with a minimum threshold (e.g., t = 0.5), increasing it only if the
system is compromised. Global auditors sample the system to identify the aver-
age download factor, and if this factor is lower than 0.98, increase the threshold.
Once the download factor reaches a satisfactory level again, the threshold may
be reduced back to its initial value. This stepwise approach allows the system to
catch freeloading nodes in case their presence starts affecting the performance
of the system, while avoiding incorrect accusations of correct nodes.
We also considered a second adaptive strategy (percentile-based) for comput-
ing the threshold based on periodically sampled download and upload factors.
The average download factors once again are used for detecting whether the
threshold should be varied or not. In this strategy, our initial threshold is set to
null. After each sampling, global auditors determine if the system is in a com-
promised state by verifying if the average sampled download factor is lower
than 0.97 . If so, the threshold is set to be the 10th percentile of the sampled
upload factors. This approach relies on efficiently sampling the system, and on
the assumption that if the system’s performance is not satisfactory, then at least
10 percent of the nodes are freeloaders.
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our auditing strategy over the
original streaming protocol. We built an event-driven simulator and used it to
simulate streaming sessions on networks with 1000 nodes and an average of 50
ms inter-node latency. The target streaming rate in the experiments was fixed
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to 500 Kb/second, and all our experiments were repeated 10 times. Confidence
intervals were small, and for simplicity are omitted from the graphs.
In all experiments, the source of the stream has an upload capacity of four
times the stream rate (2 Mbps) and is connected to 20 arbitrarily selected nodes.
Other nodes have enough download capacity to receive the stream, and upload
factor of 1.1. We defined an availability window of 10 seconds and an interest
window of 8 seconds. To evaluate the quality of each auditing strategy, we
evaluate the average download factors of correct nodes during a 100 second
time interval after auditing is first applied to the system. For the sample-based
techniques, we considered that global auditors collected information from 100
nodes between each interval of 20 seconds. Notice that the sample size does not
increase with the size of the system, which is a positive aspect of the auditing
approach. In Subsection 4.4.1, we discuss the costs involved in collecting these
samples.
In Figure 4.8, we consider the use of fixed thresholds. We studied the effects
of using different values for t, starting from 0 (no auditing) and increasing it
until 0.9 (90% of the stream rate), and present a detailed set of results on ap-
plying different thresholds to different scenarios. In each scenario, 30% of all
nodes are freeloaders. Among freeloaders, contribution rates were set to one of
0, 100, 200, or 300 Kbps (each freeloader was randomly assigned one of these
contribution rates at the beginning of a session). All other 70% nodes follow the
protocol, with a maximum contribution rate set to 550 Kbps (upload factor =
1.1). We present the average download factors (Figure 4.8(a)) and the number of
correct nodes mistakenly removed from the system, termed false positives (Fig-
ure 4.8(b)), for each of these configurations. The threshold applied is presented
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Figure 4.8: Fixed-threshold strategy
on the x-axis. In Figure 4.8(a), as the threshold increases, higher download av-
erages are observed, since more freeloading nodes are detected and punished.
However, the number of nodes incorrectly accused also increases with higher
thresholds, as observed in Figure 4.8(b).
Scenarios where freeloading nodes contribute at higher rates (300 Kbps) are
less disruptive to the system, but they also require higher thresholds to be ap-
plied. Different thresholds yield best results under different scenarios, but over-
all, from the results presented in Figure 4.8, we concluded that the best fixed
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Table 4.1: Strategies for defining the threshold t
Strategy Description
No auditing Fixed t = 0.0
Fixed-threshold Fixed t = 0.6
Stepwise adaptive Minimum t = 0.6. If avg sampled download fac-
tor < 0.97, increase t by 0.1. Decrease t back to
0.6 when avg download is satisfactory again.
Percentile-based adaptive Minimum t = 0.0. If avg sampled download fac-
tor < 0.97, t is chosen based on sampled upload
factors (t = 10th percentile of sampled upload
values).
threshold is t = 0.6, providing the best compromise in terms of performance
and false positives across all scenarios.
In Figure 4.9, we compare all three strategies presented in subsection 4.3.2
against each other and against a configuration with no auditing, under differ-
ent scenarios. We set t = 0.6 for the fixed threshold strategy and as the initial
threshold in the stepwise adaptive strategy. We summarize the three strategies
in Table 4.1. We simulated sessions where 30% of the nodes were freeloaders
and with varying ratios of contribution. In the x-axis, the contribution rate of
freeloading nodes is varied from 0 to 450 Kbps. All other nodes are correct, con-
tributing at a maximum rate of 550 Kbps. We present both the average and the
minimum download factors across all correct nodes in the system. As the con-
tribution rate of freeloading nodes increases, the download factors are expected
to increase, which is clear from the curves presented.
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Figure 4.9: Effect of strategies when freeloading rate is varied
Figure 4.9 shows that all strategies yield significantly better results compared
to an approach with no auditing. While both adaptive strategies yield excellent
download rates to correct nodes, the fixed-threshold strategy’s performance is
not as good when freeloading nodes are contributing with 300 or slightly more
Kbps (near 0.6 contribution factor). At those rates freeloading nodes are harmful
to the system, yet a threshold of 0.6 is not able to detect them.
Finally, in Figure 4.10, we consider a scenario where freeloading nodes con-
tribute with different rates. We varied the percentage of freeloading nodes in the
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system from 0 to 90%, and evenly assigned them different contribution rates.
The graphs present the average and minimum download rates for these sce-
narios. Once again, no auditing performs significantly worse than any of the
auditing strategies. Here, the stepwise adaptive approach yields the best results
when large percentages of freeloading nodes are present in the system. It is also
simpler than the percentile-based approach, since it is based only on samples of
the download rates of nodes. In both sets of experiments, the number of false
positives was practically null under all three strategies considered (at most one
in some cases).
4.4.1 Auditing Costs
The overheads imposed by auditing are an important consideration, which we
address in this subsection. Most of the work of auditing is performed by local
auditors, which are executed on the user nodes. Overheads include local stor-
age used to store the history information of the node, bandwidth required to
exchange histories, and computation overhead in verifying other nodes‘ histo-
ries. We were mostly concerned with bandwidth costs since they are limited in
P2P systems.
These overheads are constant, independent of the size of the system, and not
significant, since nodes only exchange a small amount of accounting data at pre-
defined intervals of time (for example, 10 seconds). If we consider a packet rate
of 50 packets/s, in 10 seconds the maximum number of packets received and
sent by each node is 1000. For each packet sent or received, the history needs to
indicate which neighbor sent or received the packet. By using 4 bits to identify
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Figure 4.10: Effect of strategies when percentage of freeloaders is varied
each neighbor, the size of each history packet adds up to 4000 bits (500 Bytes).
This is not significant compared to the amount of regular data exchanged in a
streaming session.
We also analyzed the costs of the global auditors. Since they are dedicated
and external to the system, the overhead imposed on them is of higher concern.
Global auditors’ main tasks consist of sampling the system to collect download
and upload rates of nodes, and of occasionally disseminating updates to the
threshold value, through gossip. The sample size remains fixed independent
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of the size of the population. We ran simulations to estimate the worst-case
standard deviation of the download rates across all nodes. Accordingly, we es-
timate that a sample size of 300 nodes is sufficient to provide 95% confidence,
independent of the population size. For smaller systems, such as the ones simu-
lated in this work, even a smaller number of samples was found to be sufficient
to yield satisfactory results. Therefore, centralized costs are fixed, and provide
a clear advantage for using auditing against tit-for-tat approaches in large-scale
systems.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented and evaluated a scalable auditing-based technique
for enforcing fairness in a live-streaming system. Our approach employs local
auditors that execute on all nodes in a streaming session. They are responsible
for collecting auditable information about other neighbors’ data exchanges, and
for verifying that neighbors upload more data than a specified threshold. This
threshold is defined by dedicated global auditors, which periodically sample
the state of the system to determine if the overall download rate is compro-
mised by the presence of opportunistic nodes. Global auditing determines the
minimum threshold for uploads, andworks with local auditing to punish nodes
that do not upload enough data.
We evaluated the efficiency of our auditing approach through simulation.
We compared different strategies for establishing the contribution threshold and
showed that a simple dynamic mechanism is able to maintain the throughput
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of the streaming system even in the presence of a large number of opportunistic
nodes.
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CHAPTER 5
CARAMBOLA: HETEROGENEITY-AWARE LIVE STREAMING
5.1 Introduction
Several peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols, and in particular the majority of live
streaming ones, characterize nodes as having homogeneous bandwidth, which
unfortunately is not realistic. Nodes often have asymmetric upload and down-
load rates and cannot contribute with as much bandwidth as ideally expected.
Meanwhile, some nodes have higher upload bandwidth, being able to con-
tribute more to the dissemination, if so desired. In this chapter, we study the
effect of heterogeneous upload bandwidths in live streaming systems and study
the potential of applying a simple placement technique for addressing problems
originating from heterogeneity.
We argue for fairness in the dissemination process, suggesting that nodes
that contribute with more data should also be granted better quality of received
data. Meanwhile, nodes that are not able or unwilling to contribute enough up-
load bandwidth may receive data at a lower rate (at the highest rate allowed
by the remaining upload resources). Throughout this chapter, the term hetero-
geneity is used in reference to nodes’ upload bandwidth, given that it is one of
the properties that most significantly affects P2P live streaming protocols.
To illustrate the problem, in Figure 5.1 we present an example of a heteroge-
neous system containing nodes with two different upload rates: 300 Kbps and
1 Mbps. The upload rate of each node is presented close to each node in the
Figure. In this simple example, the circled node may not be able to receive high-
94
Source
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Overlay with nodes with heterogeneous bandwidths
quality data, given that its download rate is limited by the upload bandwidth
of its neighbors, all of which have limited resources. Furthermore, this config-
uration may also prevent nodes with high upload bandwidth from generously
contributing to the system at their full capacity.
Our goal is to explore node placement as well as multi-layered video coding
techniques to achieve a scalable and adaptive substrate for live streaming ap-
plications. We explore different node placement techniques and analyze them
based on metrics such as fairness and quality of data delivery. We expect to
honor fairness by proposing a scheme that delivers data to users with quality
proportional to their contributed upload capacity. Our approach, Carambola,
organizes nodes into hierarchical layers according to their upload capacities:
higher-level layers receive and propagate better quality data to other members
of its layer and filter data that is propagated to members of lower-level layers.
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We evaluate our approach through simulation. Our experimental results
indicate that Carambola allows fair service quality metrics to be established
and respected according to users’ upload bandwidth. Carambola is able to sat-
isfy our defined set of stream quality metrics, allowing the system to adapt ac-
cording to receivers’ bandwidth restrictions, providing the best possible stream
quality for each profile.
Effects of Heterogeneity
To quantify the effects of node heterogeneity in mesh-based protocols, we ran
experiments using an event-based simulator of the Chainsaw protocol [76]. Two
node profiles were defined for the experiments, namely slow and fast. Slow
nodeswere able to upload 384Kbps, while the upload capacity of fast nodeswas
varied from approximately 1.0 to 3.0 Mbps. The speeds chosen for fast nodes
correspond to multiples of the upload capacity of slow nodes: approximately
2.5, 5.0 and 7.5 times higher. The upload capacity of the source of the stream
was fixed at 10 times the stream rate, and the download bandwidth of nodes
was set to a value higher than the stream rate, sufficient for all nodes to receive
all data.
A particular configuration is defined by fixed values for the stream rate, and
fixed upload bandwidths for slow and fast nodes. In our studies, we considered
6 different configurations, which are presented in Table 5.1. Streaming sessions
with rates of 600 Kbps and 850 Kbps were considered. In all simulations, results
were averaged across 100 runs of a streaming session, and node topologies were
reconstructed between successive runs.
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Table 5.1: Configurations defining streaming rate and upload rates of fast
and slow nodes
Config. Label Stream Rate
Upload BW Trans. Point
Slow Fast (% slow nodes)
2.5 - 600 Kbps
600 Kbps 384 Kbps
960 Kbps 63%
5.0 - 600 Kbps 1920 Kbps 86%
7.5 - 600 Kbps 2880 Kbps 91%
2.5 - 850 Kbps
850 Kbps 384 Kbps
960 Kbps 28%
5.0 - 850 Kbps 1920 Kbps 73%
7.5 - 850 Kbps 2880 Kbps 83%
Notice that configurations do not define the proportion of fast and slow
nodes in the system. The proportion of fast and slow nodes, given a particu-
lar configuration, defines whether the system is poor, balanced or rich regarding
overall upload bandwidth. In a poor setting, the average upload bandwidth
across all nodes is smaller than the stream rate, not allowing all nodes to receive
100% of the data. In a balanced configuration, the average upload capacity is
equal to the stream rate, and in a rich configuration the average upload band-
width is higher than the stream rate, potentially allowing all nodes to receive
all data. We define the transition point of each configuration as the percentage of
slow nodes for which the system is in a balanced state. Given a particular con-
figuration, any percentage of slow nodes less than that defined by its transition
point can potentially provide all nodes with 100% of the streamed data.
In our first set of experiments, nodes were organized into a randomly gen-
erated fully connected mesh. We first studied how the ratio of slow nodes af-
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Figure 5.2: Download rates when using random placement
fected the overall data distribution in the system. We varied the percentage of
slow nodes from 5% to 95%, with increments of 10%. The graphs in Figure 5.2
present the results when streaming 600 and 850 Kbps, respectively, using three
different profiles of upload capacity of fast nodes in each (2.5, 5.0 and 7.5 times
slow nodes’ upload rate). The metric we present is the average download factor
of nodes. It captures the average ratio of streamed packets that are successfully
received by each node relative to the stream rate. Each curve corresponds to a
particular configuration defined in Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of nodes that receive over 90% of data
As expected, increasing the ratio of slow nodes reduces the quality of
streams. Depending on the percentage of slow nodes, the overall upload ca-
pacity of the network is sometimes lower than the minimum needed to dis-
tribute the contents to all potential receivers. For a stream rate of 600 Kbps, the
transition points are 63%, 86% and 91% for the three configurations presented
in Figure 5.2(a). However, the quality of the dissemination becomes unsatis-
factory even before the system is in a balanced or scarce state. The same can be
observed in the results with a stream rate of 850 Kbps, presented in Figure 5.2(b)
(for which transition points are 28%, 73% and 83%).
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In Figure 5.3, we study the 5.0 - 600 Kbps and 5.0 - 850 Kbps configurations
in further detail (upload bandwidth of fast nodes is five times faster than that of
slow nodes). We present the percentage of fast and slow nodes that receive over
90% of the packets within their expiration time, again varying the percentage
of slow nodes from 5% to 95%. We can observe that when the system’s overall
upload capacity is reduced (caused by larger ratios of slow nodes), fast nodes
are not guaranteed to receive all data, despite their higher levels of contribution.
In some cases, nodes contributing less receive more data than nodes willing to
contribute with high upload bandwidths.
In realistic scenarios, we expect nodes with lower upload bandwidth to be
more common than better provisioned nodes. For comparison purposes, from
hereon we will work with configurations composed of 25% fast nodes and 75%
slow nodes. The losses experienced by nodes in randomly organized mesh
structures highlight the importance of exploring placement properties in live
streaming systems.
5.2 System Design
In this section, we present Carambola, our topological approach to leverage
bandwidth heterogeneity in live streaming systems. Our goal with Carambola
is to offer a variable flow of packets to heterogeneous nodes, where each node’s
rate of received packets is proportional to its contributed upload capacity. We
begin by presenting the system model and our basic assumptions. Later, we
describe the basic protocol, followed by experimental results obtained through
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simulation. We then explore and evaluate the use of packet filtering, and present
a study of packet latency when using Carambola.
5.2.1 SystemModel and Assumptions
Our model assumes the existence of one source and a fixed set of consumers in-
terested in receiving the streamed data within a specific fixed delay. The source
has limited upload resources, which allows it to send data only to a small sub-
set of consumers. The original stream consists of a sequence of packets, which
may be sent out of order and reassembled by the receivers. Depending on the
method used to code packets, some of them may be neglected [14, 47]. Packets
may include redundant information for error correction or coding schemes that
may decompose data into hierarchical information levels.
Our approach assumes that the upload capacity of nodes interested in the
stream can be determined when they initially join the network. This knowl-
edge may be provided by the node itself, or derived through system evaluation,
and is required since we use the upload capacity as a reference of the node’s
ability to contribute to the network. Although nodes often present asymmetric
download/upload rates, we employ a homogeneous exchange: a node’s de-
clared upload parameter is used to establish the target quality of data received
by the node. We again use the qualifiers fast and slow to refer to nodes with
higher and smaller upload capacities.
All nodes are assumed to have at least as much download capacity as the
stream rate. Among broadband users, which is the class of users we consider in
our studies, this is a realistic assumption. Download rates are typically higher
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than upload rates in asymmetric links, and download rates are often sufficient
for typical video transmissions.
We also assume that nodes follow the protocol as defined, contributing as
much to the network as they declare when joining the system. The auditing
techniques presented in Chapter 4 may be employed in untrusted settings to
enforce that nodes contribute as much as they are expected to.
5.2.2 Basic protocol
In Carambola, nodes are organized into multiple hierarchical layers based on
their upload capacities: faster nodes are placed in higher layers, closer to the
source, while slower ones are placed progressively farther away. Nodes within
each layer are organized into a connected mesh, in which nodes have approxi-
mately the same number of neighbors. The source is only connected to a subset
of nodes from the topmost layer. Furthermore, unidirectional links are main-
tained between nodes in different layers, with the goal of boosting the propa-
gation of packets down the hierarchy. All fast nodes have one or more slower
nodes as neighbors, to which they forward packets.
An example of an overlay with 5 fast nodes and 15 slow nodes under the
Carambola configuration is presented in Figure 5.4. In the example, each fast
node is connected to two slow nodes (we refer to this configuration as 1p2).
Although we only consider two node profiles (fast and slow), Carambola may
easily be extended to larger numbers of layers.
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Figure 5.4: Multi-layer node configuration.
Nodes in the highest layer aim to receive all the data, as originally sent by the
source. Within each layer, a pull-based style of packet exchange is employed,
similar to the Chainsaw protocol [76]. Peers notify their neighbors whenever
new packets are received, and request packets based on the received notifica-
tions.
Links between nodes of adjacent layers are used to disseminate data down
the hierarchy, and help reduce the delay with which slower nodes receive data.
This happens because fast nodes notify the receipt of new packets to its fast
and slow neighbors simultaneously, allowing slow nodes to request data from
fast nodes as soon as fast nodes receive them from the source. This keeps the
average packet arrival delays at slow nodes close to the delays observed on fast
nodes. These links also allow slow nodes to receive more data than they would
be able to, given that it leverages the extra upload capacity of faster nodes.
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For nodes in the lower hierarchy, nodes in the higher hierarchy mimic the
behavior of the source. There is one particular difference with respect to links
connecting nodes of different layers: the flow of data is unidirectional, and pack-
ets are always sent from nodes in faster layers towards nodes in slower layers.
Furthermore, if the aggregated upload capacity of the system is not enough to
serve all nodeswith all data, not all packets are notified and forwarded to slower
layers, but instead, only data that has undergone a filtering process.
This approach presents two main advantages. First, it leads to a fair sys-
tem, where nodes that contribute with more bandwidth resources are awarded
with higher quality streams, while nodes contributing less receive lower quality
streams. Furthermore, exceeding upload capacity of fast nodes may be explored
to provide slower nodes with higher quality data.
5.3 Evaluation
Wemodified the simulator to evaluate the effect of using our approach to stream
data. For comparison purposes, the configurations previously defined in the
previous section were used in the experiments. Given these configurations, in
this section we focus on a fixed ratio of 25% fast nodes and 75% slow nodes. In
Figure 5.5(a), we present the average download factor of fast and slow nodes
during sessions using (a) random node placement and (b) the placement per-
formed by Carambola. Each cluster of columns refers to a particular configura-
tion.
From the graph, it can be observed that when employing a random node
placement strategy, the average download rates of fast and slow nodes are sim-
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Figure 5.5: Comparison between random and Carambola topologies
ilar. In some cases, slow nodes are unfairly privileged over fast nodes. With
Carambola, a different pattern is observed: fast nodes, which are closer to the
source and only limited by their own upload capacities, achieve satisfactory
results in most cases. In all configurations, our approach eliminates the con-
straints less provisioned neighbors impose on fast nodes. Fast nodes are fa-
vored, being allowed to first exchange packets amongst each other, before lever-
aging their extra upload capacity to provide better quality streams to slower
nodes.
Figure 5.5(b) presents the percentage of nodes with packet loss < 10% for
the same set of experiments. For all configurations, Carambola outperforms the
random placement approach, and in all but the scarcest configuration (2.5− 850
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Kbps), most fast nodes receive over 90% of the data. In two of the richer config-
urations (5.0− 600 Kbps and 7.5− 600 Kbps) most slow nodes also receive over
90% of data, leveraging resources from fast nodes.
The unidirectional links between fast and slow nodes may benefit slow
nodes, and by doing so may harm the receipt of data by fast nodes in scarce
configurations. This can be observed from the bars relative to configuration 2.5
− 850 Kbps. In this set of experiments, each fast node was linked to three slow
nodes, with no particular control mechanism in place to avoid slow nodes from
pulling toomuch bandwidth from fast nodes. In the next subsection, we explore
the effect of varying parameters relative to these inter-layer connections.
5.3.1 Inter-layer links
Carambola’s basic protocol defines unidirectional links between successive lay-
ers to ensure flow of data to less privileged layers. In all previous experiments,
each fast node was connected to three slow nodes. However, the number of
links per fast node may be varied, and the ideal value depends on factors that
define the scarcity of the system, such as the ratio of fast to slow nodes, the
upload capacity of the nodes, and the target streaming rate.
In Figure 5.6, we compare the quality of streaming when using 3, 2, and
1 links per fast node, respectively. The graph presents the average download
factor across all nodes for each configuration. Notice that with a composition
consisting of 25% fast and 75% slow nodes, in order for every slow node to
be connected to at least one fast node, the number of inter-layer links per fast
node should be at least 3; only configuration 1p3 satisfies this requirement. This
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property is desired when fast nodes are over-provisioned and slow nodes can
benefit from fast nodes’ excess of upload capacity. However, as observed in
the bars for configuration 2.5 − 850 Kbps in Figure 5.5(b), unlimited access to
resources at fast nodes can harm the exchange of packets amongst fast nodes.
When we reduce the number of slow nodes connected to each fast node (1p1
and 1p2), two situations may occur: (1) in scarce configurations, fast nodes’
resources are not aggressively consumed by slow nodes, and therefore, their
upload capacity is first used to disseminate data to their similar neighbors and
improve the results of their own layer, before providing data to their less provi-
sioned neighbors; (2) in rich configurations, the excess upload bandwidth may
not entirely be used to supply data to slow nodes.
We can observe these two effects in Figure 5.6. In configuration 2.5 − 850
Kbps, which is a scarce configuration, using less connections between fast and
slow nodes reduces the quality of streams to slow nodes while it improves that
of fast nodes. Meanwhile, in the remaining configurations all fast nodes receive
full data but slow nodes are affected by the reduction in the number of connec-
tions, leading to underutilization of resources.
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The node placement approach explored by Carambola establishes clear
boundaries between layers of nodes with different bandwidth characteristics.
At these boundaries, data may be filtered before propagated to nodes in lower
layers, an alternative that may be explored in scarce configurations, where not
enough upload bandwidth is available to provide all nodes with 100% of data.
The amount of filtering reduction may be tuned depending on the configuration
of the system, specially the upload capacity of slow nodes.
The MPEG video-coding technology favors the use of filtering because it al-
lows data to be organized in layers [71]. The separate sub-streams representing
individual layers are called base and enhancement layers. The base layer is inde-
pendently coded and decoded, not needing any additional information. Each
following layer (enhancement layer) is hierarchically coded based on the previ-
ous one. When incorporating filtering to Carambola, fast nodes receive both the
base and enhancement layers, but only forward the base layer to slow nodes.
Filtering requires fast nodes to examine the header of packets to identify if they
belong to the base or enhancement layers, and only send notifications of base
layer packets to slower neighbors. When more than two layers are used for
grouping nodes with different upload capacities, multiple enhancement layers
may be used.
5.3.2 Packet Latency
We evaluated the effect of organizing nodes into interconnected hierarchical lay-
ers on packet latencies. We measured the delays of packets received by each
individual node in streaming sessions containing 100 fast nodes and 300 slow
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Figure 5.7: Latency in packet distribution without filtering.
nodes, with each fast node connected to three slow nodes. We considered four
upload capacities for fast nodes, namely 2.5, 5.0, 7.5, and 10.0 times higher than
the upload capacity of slow nodes, which was fixed at 384 Kbps. The target
streaming rate was fixed at 850 Kbps.
Scatter graphs presenting the minimum, average andmaximum latencies (in
seconds) observed by each node in sample streaming session are presented in
Figure 5.7. Fast nodes may be easily identified in the leftmost one quarter of
each graph (nodes 1 to 100), while slow nodes’ latencies may be visualized in
the rightmost three quarters of each graph (nodes 101 to 400). The experiments
were also repeated with 5,000 nodes with no significant differences in latency
results. No filtering between layers was applied.
109
It can be observed from the graphs that, as expected, the latencies of slow
nodes are higher than that experienced by fast nodes, even though their aver-
age values are not significantly different. The average andmaximum delays im-
prove between graphs 5.7(a) and 5.7(b), where the upload capacity of fast nodes
increases from 2.5 to 5.0 times that of slow nodes. These first two configurations
are scarce, which explains the observed differences in packet latencies. When
the system is under-provisioned, fast nodes’ resources are in higher demand,
and therefore, packet distribution among fast nodes is slowed down. Once the
configuration becomes balanced, latencies do not improve much further: the
rich configuration presented in Figure 5.7(d) does not present significantly im-
proved latencies compared to the balanced configuration in Figure 5.7(c).
We also considered the latency of packets when filtering is applied. Since
less data is propagated to slower nodes, we expected latencies to be lower than
in unfiltered systems. In Figure 5.8, we present latencies for configurations 2.5 -
850 Kbps and 5.0 - 850 Kbps with 50% filtering between layers. When filtering is
applied, reductions in packet latency are observed mainly for slow nodes. The
average packet latencies are practically the same for fast and slow nodes, unlike
scenarios with no filtering. Maximum packet latency across nodes is still higher
for slow nodes.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter we studied the effect of peers’ heterogeneous upload bandwidths
on the quality of live streaming applications and presented Carambola, a new
approach for organizing nodes that leads to increased fairness in the distribu-
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Figure 5.8: Latency in packet distribution with filtering.
tion of resources. Nodes in Carambola are organized into hierarchical mesh-
based layers, where layers containing nodes with higher upload bandwidths
are logically placed closer to the source of the stream. The advantages of mesh-
based overlays are fully explored with this approach, and the unpredictabil-
ity present in approaches that rely on random node placement are eliminated.
Additional connections between nodes from adjacent layers allow nodes with
lower upload bandwidths to leverage the exceeding upload capacity of richer
nodes while ensuring that rich nodes are guaranteed full quality data for their
higher contribution. Finally, we employed data filtering across layers when the
aggregate upload bandwidth of the system is not sufficient to provide all nodes
with full quality data.
Through simulation, we evaluated our approach against random topologies,
using various metrics, and considering several different bandwidth configura-
tions for nodes in the system. In all cases, our results indicated that Carambola
achieves better fairness, providing higher-level applications with a simple sub-
strate that is able to disseminate data with quality proportional to nodes’ levels
of contribution to the system.
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CHAPTER 6
NIGHTWATCH: GOSSIP-BASED DISTRIBUTION ESTIMATION
6.1 Introduction
Extending mesh-based live streaming to settings with heterogeneous band-
widths as described in the previous chapter requires nodes to organize them-
selves into layers based on their upload bandwidth. Furthermore, deciding
whether filtering should be applied between layers, and the amount of filter-
ing to be applied depends on the overall upload bandwidth of the system. As
part of an effort to extend live streaming to heterogeneous settings, we have ex-
plored techniques that allow nodes to estimate the distribution of values held by
all nodes in a system, providing them with information they can use to define
parameters needed in the system.
Despite our original motivation, the knowledge of how one ranks relative
to peers has broader applicability and can be put to a variety of other uses.
It allows outliers to be detected, overall trends to be observed and informed
predictions to be made. A tool that allows nodes to maintain an estimate of
what values other peers hold for particular properties can help systems be more
resilient and self-adapt in sophisticated ways. In this work, we present an ap-
proach where nodes build such estimates in a timely and scalable manner. Our
approach relies on gossip-style exchange of data, and uses data synopsis tech-
niques for minimizing the amount of data exchanged between pairs of nodes.
Nodes maintain a fixed-size array of entries and periodically exchange and ac-
cumulate information obtained from other peers.
112
Previous work has focused on the diagnosis of individual aggregate values,
such as averages, sums, minimum and maximum values of distributions. Tree-
based approaches compute aggregates hierarchically and under no-failure sce-
narios allow exact values to be computed [99, 109]. In the presence of node
failures or nodes joining and leaving the system, decentralized gossip-based
techniques present a more resilient model, even though computation of exact
aggregates may not always be possible [59, 54]. We do not attempt to present
nodes with exact distribution models since that would lead to high costs with-
out adding significant benefits, but instead focus on providing a more expres-
sive model that provides nodes with an approximation of the entire distribution
rather than just individual aggregates.
To restrict the storage and communication costs, we explore previous work
on data synopsis from the database community, originally for approximate
query answering in the context of large repositories. Typically, the goal is that
within a single pass through all the data a concise representation be created
which allows queries to be answered within short delays of time. Two main
differences in using these techniques within our gossiping context are that: (a)
a large number of duplicates are present in the sample; and (b) not all data
is available to every node. We will argue in this chapter that the presence of
duplicates does not significantly bias the estimated distributions, and that it is
therefore simpler and more efficient to leverage their presence in the samples
than attempting to remove them.
We evaluated our gossip-based approach through simulation when coupled
with four data synopsis techniques. We compared these in terms of quality of
the estimation, storage and bandwidth requirements, and convergence time.
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All techniques were evaluated with a diverse set of distributions, including
uniform, normal, heavy-tailed and bimodal distributions. By experimenting
with up to 100 K nodes, we have empirically validated that a limited number of
rounds and a constant message throughput per node in each round is sufficient
to achieve an efficient and lightweight protocol.
6.2 System Design
6.2.1 Problem Statement
We assume a system consisting of N nodes with identifiers 1 to N. Each node i
holds a numerical value xi that measures some variable of interest to the system.
The set of values X held by all nodes may follow any arbitrary distribution. The
main goal of our protocol is that within a predetermined interval of time, every
node is able to produce a satisfactory estimate of the distribution of values xi
held by all nodes in the system.
The set of values held by nodes may vary with time. The protocol executes
in phases, which are in turn subdivided into rounds. Within each phase, each
node converges to an estimate of the distribution. The estimates produced at the
end of each phase are an approximation of the distribution of values held at the
beginning of the phase. When a new phase is started, old values are discarded
in favor of newer ones.
The notion of what is a satisfactory estimate of the distribution is subjective,
and may vary depending on the purpose of the application using the estimated
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distribution. Instead of attempting to achieve perfect accuracy, we focus on the
best balance between space overhead and accuracy, also taking into account the
time complexity of the solution.
6.2.2 Basic Protocol
Nodes execute in rounds and phases. A phase is the larger time interval in
which each node produces an estimate of the distribution of values. Each phase
is composed of rounds of approximately fixed duration δ (e.g. 1 second). Even
though rounds have a fixed duration, strict time synchronization among nodes
is not required since time is only used as a rough guideline for nodes to be aware
of when to proceed to the next step of the protocol. Each node is responsible for
advancing rounds based on its local clock, and advancing phases when it estab-
lishes some criteria that indicates that a phase has completed. In this subsection
we focus on the steps followed by each node within a single phase.
We assume that nodesmaintain a set of neighbors at any given time, by using
a decentralized membership protocol such as the one presented in [6]. Each
node maintains a local view (its set of neighbors), and periodically updates it
by randomly picking from the local views of its neighbors and from other nodes
that contact it in the previous round. Nodes always remember a list of at least as
many live distinct nodes as the number of rounds in a phase (usually between
15 and 20).
Every node maintains an array of k numerical values. At the beginning of
each phase, all k values in the array are set to the value xi, originally held by the
node. In each round, a node i randomly chooses a partner j and requests the
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set of values stored by the partner. Once it receives the array of values from j,
node i has 2k values, which get merged into an array of size k. In the simplest
protocol, hereafter called Swap, merging consists of randomly picking k of these
values and discarding the others.
With the Swap protocol, nodes randomly discard data previously available to
them, therefore loosing important information when estimating the distribution
of values. Data synopsis techniques allow peers to store data previously seen
with limited loss of information and consume less space. We next consider three
such synopsis construction techniques.
Concise Counting
The first technique we considered is an adaptation of the counting samples ap-
proach [40] for compressing data in large data warehouses. In the original ap-
proach, values appearing more than once in the sample are represented as a
value and a count pair. Given that we are dealing with floating point numbers
and have fixed storage space, the following adaptations were made: all entries
in our array are tuples of <value, counter>. Whenever new values are added
to the sample, the tuples are sorted based on their values, and the closest values
in the sample are merged together, so that only a fixed number of tuples are in
the sample at any given time. Merging two tuples consists of randomly picking
one of the two values and adding their respective counters.
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Equi-Width Histograms
A straightforward histogram technique breaks the range of possible values into
equal sized bins, and maintaining counters for each bin. One difficulty with
this Equi-Width approach occurs when nodes are not aware of what the extreme
values of the distribution are. In our implementation, each node i initially con-
siders the set of values to range from 0 to the value they hold (xi), and later re-
sizes the bins dynamically in case new values beyond the extremities are found.
When resizing, each old bin is mapped to a larger new bin, based on the middle
value of the old bin, and the ranges of the new resized bins. The counter of each
old bin is added to the new bin to which it is mapped. The main advantage of
the Equi-Width approach when compared to the Concise approach is that since
bins have equal width, only the extreme values of the whole distribution and
counters for each bin need to be stored, reducing the amount of data stored and
transferred.
Equi-Depth Histograms
Dividing the range of values into Equi-Width partitions may lead to very inac-
curate estimations depending on the original distribution of values. Another
choice consists in using Equi-Depth bins, where each bin contains an approxi-
mately equal number of points. In our implementation of the Equi-Depth his-
togram approach, each node i initially divides the range [0, xi] into fixed sized
bins, each represented by a pair of <value, counter>. A simple protocol is used
to later merge or split bins based on their counters as new data is inserted. Af-
ter exchanging data with another peer, each node orders all collected pairs of
<value, counter> and computes which consecutive bins, when merged, yield
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the smallest combined bin. The identified bins are merged (their counters are
added and the weighted arithmetic mean of their values is used as the value of
the new bin) and the process is repeated until only the desired number of bins
are left. Themain goal of this process is to minimize the disparity across all bins.
6.3 Evaluation
We built a round-based simulator to evaluate our gossip-based approach and to
compare its behavior when coupledwith the four data synopsis techniques. Un-
less otherwise stated, we ran experiments simulating 10.000 nodes with partial
connectivity. Nodes held arrays containing 50 values, which were simultane-
ously updated only at the end of each round.
We used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance as the quality metric of a distri-
bution estimate relative to the original distribution. The KS-distance measures
the maximum vertical distance between the actual cumulative distribution and
the cumulative estimated distribution. In practical terms, it measures the max-
imum disparity between the real and estimated percentages of nodes that hold
more or less than any particular value. For instance, a KS-distance of 0.1 implies
that the estimated percentage of nodes larger and smaller than some particular
value might be off by up to 10%.
Therefore, the KS-distance is a general metric for evaluating the quality of
the estimations when calculating percentiles. We always present the maximum
KS-distance across all nodes in the system, which is indicative of the worst-case
estimation, since we aim to achieve a protocol that allows all nodes to compute
satisfactory estimates. Even though of interest, individual aggregates such as
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mean, medium,min/max and others are omitted given that they are less general
than the KS-distance when evaluating estimated distributions.
6.3.1 Effect of Duplicates
In our first experiment we explore the effect of duplicate values in the data
samples accumulated by nodes. To estimate the time and data required in an
optimal data collection scenario, we considered a non-practical protocol where
nodes use gossip to exchange vectors that accumulate all data received from
peers (Gossip with Duplicates). Nodes exchange larger arrays as rounds progress,
and arrays contain duplicate values. Next, we considered a similar setting, but
in which duplicates were removed (Gossip with Duplicates Removed). Our goal
with these experiments was to analyze the penalty incurred by keeping dupli-
cates in the collected samples.
In Figure 6.1, a comparison of the two experiments is presented over in-
creasing numbers of rounds. In the presented example the set of values held by
nodes followed an exponential distribution; the results for other distributions
were similar or better and are therefore omitted. The curve for the setting where
duplicates are removed shows that all nodes converge to the ideal distribution
around the 15th round (the lines show the metrics for the worst-case node at
any round). When duplicates are not removed, nodes converge to a maximum
KS-distance of approximately 0.06, again around the 15th round. This differ-
ence in quality of the estimates is the tradeoff for the simplicity of not having
to remove duplicates from the samples. All data summarization techniques we
evaluate can perform at best as well as the curve for Gossip with Duplicates.
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Figure 6.1: Effect of duplicates in collected samples
6.3.2 Sample Distributions
We compared the performance of the four data summarization techniques when
combined with the gossip protocol in terms of quality of the estimates under
a diverse set of distributions. We considered uniform, normal, exponential,
Pareto, chi-square, lognormal, Weibull and multimodal distributions, all with
varying parameter values. For conciseness, we only present graphs for four
representative distributions: uniform, exponential (λ = 1.5), Pareto (k = 5,
xm = 1), and one bimodal distribution composed by adding two normal distri-
butions (with parameters µ1 = 5,σ1 = 1, and µ2 = 8,σ2 = 0.5).
Among the distributions considered, uniform was the easiest to estimate,
as observed in Figure 6.2. While the Swap technique falls behind with a large
KS-distance, the three other summarization techniques perform well, with KS-
distances always smaller than 0.1. This obviates the importance of accumulating
enough values to make adequate predictions. It is worth mentioning that in the
Swap approach some nodes are able to estimate the distribution as well as nodes
in the other three approaches (not shown in the graph). However, as previously
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of strategies with exponential distribution
stated, we use the worst node’s estimate as a metric since we expect all nodes to
achieve satisfactory knowledge.
Next, we considered an exponential distribution, which as observed, af-
fected the performance of the Concise technique (Figure 6.3). The main rea-
son for this technique’s poor performance is that it maintains a fixed number
of <value,counter> pairs, and merges the pairs with closest values whenever
needed. In distributions where data is not evenly distributed, the approach uses
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of strategies with Pareto distribution
most space storing dispersed values which represent a minority of the values in
the system.
The Equi-Width histogram approach suffers from the same problem as the
Concise approach since it divides the space of values into equal-sized bins. While
the Equi-Width approach worked well with most of the distributions we consid-
ered, it failed to do so with heavy-tailed distributions such as the Pareto distri-
bution considered for the experiment in Figure 6.4. In this distribution, most
nodes hold small values that do not get differentiated into separate bins, which
leads to poor computation of percentiles and large KS-distance metrics.
The bimodal distribution did not present further challenges when compared
to the previous distributions despite the presence of two modes. A more de-
tailed analysis confirmed that it is possible to compute the mean, median, and
other percentiles accurately with the three later synopsis techniques.
As evidenced from the graphs for these four distributions, the Equi-Depth
approach consistently performs well, maintaining the worst-case KS-distance
metric around 0.07. This behavior was maintained when we experimented
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Figure 6.5: Comparison of strategies with bimodal distribution
with several other distributions and parameters not presented. The Equi-Width
technique also performed satisfactorily for most of the distributions, but as ob-
served, significantly degrades under severely skewed distributions. The ad-
vantage of the Equi-Width technique lies on the fact that it requires only ap-
proximately half the space required by the Equi-Depth approach since only the
extremity values and the bin size need to be stored.
Another approach to evaluate the different data summarization techniques
consists in using the estimated distributions computed by the nodes to estimate
the parameters of the original distributions (known a priori in a controlled set-
ting). We show in Figure 6.6 how well the techniques perform in terms of es-
timating the parameters of exponential and Pareto distributions. On the x-axis
we varied the value of the parameter used to generate the distribution of values
across the nodes, and on the y-axis we present the actual worst-case estimates
computed by the nodes at the end of 15 rounds.
A perfect estimation of values would be represented by the identity function.
These curves validate the observations that the Equi-Depth approach yields the
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Figure 6.6: Estimation of parameters
most accurate results, and shows how the Equi-Width and the Concise approach
can lead to completely erroneous estimates of the original parameters of the
distribution for heavy-tailed applications. Even though the Swap technique does
not yield accurate distribution estimates, it is interesting to note that it performs
consistently on all distributions.
We also performed experiments with larger numbers of nodes to study how
the number of rounds varies with larger systems. We experimented with up to
100 K nodes using the Equi-Depth technique. One interesting thing that was ob-
124
served was that the number of rounds for convergence remained 15, even when
experimenting with 100 K nodes. While further analysis would be required to
estimate the number of rounds for larger networks, the observed results are a
positive indication on the time complexity of the protocol.
One limitation of our gossip-based approach is that although it is able to
capture the general distribution of values with satisfactory accuracy, it does not
necessarily reflect the effect of extreme values. This means that extreme values
are not accurately recorded by nodes, and in situations where a very small num-
ber of nodes significantly affects particular aggregate values, nodes may not be
able to accurately estimate these. This problemmay be alleviated by pairing our
approach with previously employed approaches to compute individual aggre-
gates. Further work is required to studywhether an efficient solution combining
benefits of both approaches is feasible.
6.3.3 Array Size
One important parameter to consider in our approach is the size of the arrays
used to store and exchange data. In all previous experiments we employed
arrays with 50 elements. The types of elements in each array vary with each
approach: floating point values for the Swap technique, integers for the Equi-
Width approach and pairs of <float, integer> for the Concise and Equi-Depth
approaches. Storage-wise, the Swap and Equi-Width approaches were more effi-
cient in the previous experiments. To confirm that adding further storage space
to these techniques would not lead to different outcomes, we evaluated the ef-
fect the array-size has on the estimations.
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Figure 6.7: Effect of array size
In Figure 6.7, we present how the maximum KS-distance among nodes at
the end of the 15th round varies with increasing array-sizes. We again present
results for the exponential and Pareto distributions. Increasing the array-size
did lead to improved results in most cases, as expected, but even with arrays
of 100 elements, none of the three techniques is able to outperform the Equi-
Depth technique with 50 elements. Another important point to notice is that the
Equi-Depth approach does not benefit significantly from using arrays containing
more than 40 or 50 elements. Depending on the bandwidth requirements of
applications, even 20 or 30 elements may produce satisfactory estimates.
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6.4 Summary
In this chapter we presented and evaluatedNightWatch, a scalable gossip-based
technique that allows nodes to estimate distributions of values held by other
peers. Unlike approaches which attempt to compute individual aggregates of
values, our approach aims at complementing this information with knowledge
about how any value ranks relative to others. In NightWatch, nodes periodi-
cally exchange an array of data that concisely summarizes the data they have
previously seen.
Through simulation, we compared different synopsis techniques for com-
pressing data that is gossiped among nodes, thereby saving space required for
storing and exchanging data. We considred several distributions in our exper-
iments, including heavy-tailed and bimodal distributions. We observed that
the data synopsis technique adopted can severely impact the quality of the es-
timates collected, and that the Equi-depth histogram technique provides a good
balance between space requirements and quality of estimation.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The Internet provides a promising medium for dissemination of multimedia
contents in real time. Peer-to-peer live streaming technology has the potential
to fulfill this promise by allowing any end user on the Internet to be either the
producer or the consumer of data being disseminated, without requiring pro-
hibitive networking and computational resources. Aiming for this goal, signifi-
cant work has been dedicated to live streaming, and led to simple and efficient
protocols. Using the upload bandwidth of the nodes interested in receiving
the contents to help in the dissemination process, state of the art protocols al-
low data to reach thousands of receivers without requiring extra bandwidth
resources at the source of the stream.
Unfortunately, practical considerations, such as security and heterogeneity
of network bandwidths, were overlooked at these initial protocols. Our work
makes it clear that these are important if such services are to be deployed at
large scale on the Internet. A simple investigation of the properties of previous
protocols exposes their vulnerabilities in the presence of a few non-cooperative
nodes. In some cases, one such node is able to prevent several interested nodes
from receiving any data. Furthermore, most existing protocols consider set-
tings where all users present homogeneous upload bandwidths, which do not
at all scale to settings where such assumption does not hold. This dissertation
attempted to address some of these issues, and focused on techniques for im-
proving reliability of peer-to-peer live streaming systems, and for increasing
scalability to settings with heterogeneous bandwidth requirements.
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7.1 Summary
This section summarizes the main contributions of this dissertation. First, the
investigation of vulnerabilities of existing live streaming systems led to the de-
sign of SecureStream, a peer-to-peer live streaming protocol tailored to handle
a variety of malicious attacks. This dissertation described the components of
SecureStream and the main techniques employed to resist against Denial of Ser-
vice, forgery, membership and omission attacks. An evaluation of SecureStream
showed that the system tolerates a limited percentage of malicious nodes, grace-
fully degrading in the presence of increasing ratios of malicious nodes.
Next, we presented the design and evaluation of a scalable auditing-based
technique for enforcing fairness in a live streaming system. The approach em-
ploys local auditors that execute on all nodes in a streaming session. They are
responsible for collecting auditable information about other neighbors’ data ex-
changes, and for verifying that neighbors upload more data than a specified
threshold. This threshold is defined by dedicated global auditors, which pe-
riodically sample the state of the system to determine if the overall download
rate is compromised by the presence of opportunistic nodes. Global auditing
determines the minimum threshold for uploads, and works with local auditing
to punish nodes that do not upload enough data. We presented results that indi-
cate the efficiency of this auditing approach through simulation, showing that it
is able to maintain the throughput of the streaming system even in the presence
of a large number of opportunistic nodes.
Furthermore, we studied the effect of heterogeneous upload bandwidth on
the quality of multimedia streaming applications and the design of Caram-
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bola, a new approach for organizing nodes that leads to fair distribution of
resources. Nodes in Carambola are organized into hierarchical mesh-based lay-
ers, with layers containing nodes with higher upload capacity being logically
placed closer to the source. The advantages of mesh-based overlays are fully
explored with this approach, eliminating the unpredictability present in ap-
proaches that rely on random node placement. Additional connections between
nodes from adjacent layers allow nodes with less upload capacity to leverage
the excess upload capacity of richer nodes while ensuring that rich nodes are
guaranteed full quality data for their higher contribution. Combined with data
filtering across layers, streaming is further scaled for scenarios when the aggre-
gate upload bandwidth of the system is not sufficient to provide all nodes with
full quality data. By evaluating this approach against random topologies, we
showed how Carambola achieves increased fairness, providing higher-level ap-
plications with a simple substrate that is able to disseminate data with quality
proportional to nodes’ levels of contribution to the system.
Finally, we presented the design of a gossip-based technique that allows
nodes to estimate distributions of values held by other peers. The original mo-
tivation for this work was to design a tool that allows nodes in streaming ses-
sions to rank their bandwidths relative to other nodes in the system in a scalable
and inexpensive manner. However, the tool has much wider applicability and
can be used for monitoring purposes in distributed systems in general. Unlike
approaches which attempt to compute individual aggregates of values, our so-
lution aims at complementing this information with knowledge about how any
value ranks relative to others. We presented a comparison of different synopsis
techniques for compressing data that is gossiped among nodes, thereby saving
space required for storing and exchanging data.
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The techniques employed in this dissertation, although independent, were
designed to complement each other, and when combined, lead to a highly re-
silient and scalable system. Even though further work is required, the simplicity
of each technique contributes to the design of a practical and efficient service, re-
ducing the gap towards building practical peer-to-peer live streaming systems
capable of fulfilling the original goal of allowing any user to easily stream data
in real time to any interested set of receivers.
7.2 Limitations and Open Questions
This section presents open research questions related to the work presented in
this dissertation. Despite significant progress on P2P live streaming systems,
there are still limitations and further research is required to make such systems
more practical and therefore popularize the widespread use of the technology.
Some possible areas of research are briefly described next.
One interesting and fairly unexplored topic of research is the consideration
of network locality in the context of live streaming systems. One of the main
drawbacks of application-level multicast when compared to IP multicast is the
extra load on links, given that most protocols are entirely based on an overlay
and ignore the underlying network topology through which the data flows. By
taking peer locality into account when assigning neighbors to nodes, packet
latencies and the overhead on the underlying infrastructure can potentially be
reduced. DagStream [66] and Rainbow [22] are two systems which attempt to
consider network locality in streaming, and present some preliminary results
on the benefits of taking locality into account.
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Given the vast amount of research that has been dedicated to developing
live streaming protocols, research that compares existing approaches and tries
to better model and understand their tradeoffs would prove very useful. Com-
parative studies between push and pull-based streaming protocols, for example,
are an interesting topic of study that can clarify the benefits of each of these ap-
proaches. Limited work has been conducted to identify the tradeoffs between
these two main paradigms, and most work has focused on protocols which
follow either of them, without providing exhaustive data that show which
paradigm, if any, is superior. Another interesting study consists in comparing
the tit-for-tat style of contribution enforcement with audit-based approaches.
The use of auditing can also be further explored to avoid and discourage vol-
untary deviation from protocols. The use of authenticated messages, public au-
ditable histories of interactions, and a combination of local and global auditing
are techniques that may be generalized to other application domains. Several
applications present the need for auditing/monitoring tools, and therefore one
interesting topic of research consists in building a general auditing infrastruc-
ture which can be easily tuned and employed by different applications, with a
user-controlled tradeoff between sensitivity of the detection system and the risk
of false positives.
Finally, further work is also necessary to create data aggregation tools re-
silient to malicious and selfish behaviors by participating nodes. The Night-
Watch system does not provide any mechanisms for resisting against unex-
pected behavior; malicious peers may provide erroneous data to partners, rad-
ically changing the outcome of the estimated distributions. In fact, it would be
challenging to modify the current protocol in order to avoid malicious behavior,
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and therefore NightWatch would not provide the desired guarantees in settings
where nodes are untrusted.
7.3 Concluding Remarks
This dissertation argued for the deployment of live streaming systems at the
application level and attempted to enhance the state of art of peer-to-peer live
streaming protocols. One of the goals consisted in understanding current vul-
nerabilities of existing systems and proposing techniques that alleviate or avoid
the effect of attackers, while maintaining the overall performance of the sys-
tem. The second main goal consisted in exploring techniques that allow stream-
ing systems to scale to settings where nodes have heterogeneous bandwidths,
allowing streaming to be deployed in more realistic settings over the Internet.
While further work is still required, we hope the work presented in this disserta-
tion has contributed towards the goal of increasing the reliability and scalability
of live streaming systems.
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